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 The prevailing narrative in political science is that evangelical identity drives the political 
behavior of evangelicals.  This has generated a variety of puzzles for us, in that we struggle to explain 
how people who are quite similar in terms of their religious beliefs can be quite different in terms of their 
politics.  
 I challenge this prevailing narrative.  More specifically, I contend that evangelical identity is not 
the primary determinant of political behavior and that it is outweighed by other relevant factors, such as 
race and education.  Thus, evangelical identity can be more correctly understood as a factor that 
potentially mitigates the effects of other factors that more directly determine political behavior.  In reality, 
however, this does not occur frequently because most Christians never reach the point in their faith 
journey at which they truly make their political perspective subject to their faith perspective. 
 I test this contention using seven measures of political behavior as dependent variables: whether 
respondents voted for Donald Trump in 2016; a measure of Party Identification; whether respondents 
support gay marriage; whether respondents support a pro-life position; whether respondents support a ban 
on assault rifles; whether respondents support legal status for persons brought to the United States 
illegally as children but who have since graduated from high school in the United States; and whether 
respondents agree with the statement that racial problems in the United States are rare, isolated situations.  
The data set is the Common Content section of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 
supplemented by county level indicators drawn from the 2016 American Community Survey. 
 The results indicate that, for all seven dependent variables, the strongest effect of evangelical 
identity is exceeded by the effect of at least one other measure, such as race or education.  Further, for all 
but two of the dependent variables, the strongest evangelical effect is exceeded by the effect of at least 
one county level indicator, such as the percentage of the county population holding at least a high school 
diploma.  Thus, I conclude that evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of political behavior. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
If the Christian community doesn’t rise up like it never has in modern 
political history, and if we allow through our inaction, the left to remove 
this man from the Oval Office, then we will deserve everything that we 
get.  And if they get the White House back, it will be open season on 
Christian ministries, on churches, the IRS will be able to persecute those 
faith-based organizations again. 
 
They will – under Obamacare – be able to force them to pay for abortion 
again.  They will be able to sue the Little Sisters of the Poor and drag 
God-fearing nuns into federal court again to make them pay for abortion.  
That’s what will happen.  And it we don’t turn out and vote in the biggest 
numbers ever, we deserve it to happen. 
 
 The above statement was made by Ralph Reed, head of an organization called the Faith and 
Freedom Coalition (Galloway, 2019).  He is not new to such hysterics, having worked in years past as the 
head of the Christian Coalition, an entity affiliated with televangelist Pat Robertson.  Apparently, Reed 
made the statement to promote his (then) forthcoming book explaining why Christians are mandated – by 
their faith – to adamantly support Donald Trump. 
 Such unbridled support of President Trump is not limited to evangelical political operatives, 
however.  A number of evangelical pastors and others have expressed similar sentiments, frequently 
offering a faith-based justification for specific policies.  Perhaps the most vocal among these is Robert 
Jeffress, pastor of mega-church First Baptist in Dallas.  Jeffress has defended such theologically 
significant principles as the proposed wall on the southern border, pointing out that God commanded 
Nehemiah to build a wall around Jerusalem and stating that, “[t]he Bible says even Heaven itself is going 
to have a wall around it” (Cole, 2019). 
 Of course, the vexing aspect of examples such as these is how evangelicals could have come to so 
strongly support Donald Trump, a man whose history and continued behavior would seem to present an 
example that is radically different from what they claim to believe.  In unraveling this mystery, it is useful 
to begin with a brief review – at least from a political and social perspective – of the evangelical 
movement in the United States. 
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 According to Michael Gerson (2018), evangelicalism was the predominant religious tradition in 
America during the 1800s, but by the early 1900s evangelicals would be largely disengaged from society.  
Part of this can be explained by the shift from postmillennialism to premillennialism.  While this may 
sound insignificant, it is of more than theological importance.  Generally speaking, postmillennialism 
holds that the Second Coming of Christ will occur following a period of one thousand years of relative 
peace and prosperity for mankind.  Thus, this view offers incentives for seeking to influence society for 
the good, in that Christ will not return until after this has been achieved.  Premillennialism, on the other 
hand, posits that the period of peace and prosperity cannot occur until after the Second Coming and that – 
despite any human efforts to the contrary – society will continue to deteriorate to the point that only 
Christ will be capable of cleaning up the mess.  If that’s what you believe, your religion obviously doesn’t 
offer much encouragement for you to get out and try to engage society for the good. 
 The other big factor at work was continued scientific progress, particularly the emergence of 
evolution theory.  This fractured evangelicalism into progressives, who sought to build common ground 
between the old faith and the new science, and fundamentalists, who doubled down on their emphasis on 
traditional religious views.  Thus, fundamentalism became associated with anti-scientific and anti-
intellectual perspectives, culminating in the famous “Scopes monkey trial” challenging the teaching of 
evolution.  While they actually won the trial, “[f]undamentalists became comic figures, subject to world-
class condescension” (2018, p. 47).  This only exacerbated their withdrawal, and evangelicalism lost its 
preeminent status in American religion. 
 Scholars generally agree that things remained that way until after World War II, when 
evangelicals began to re-engage society (Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2018; 
Gerson, 2018).  This reboot of evangelicalism still offered conservative beliefs but with a softer edge that 
tried to drop the anti-intellectual cast that had been a feature in decades past; its public face was a young 
evangelist named Billy Graham (Putnam & Campbell, 2010, p. 13).  Centered primarily in the South, 
evangelicals had for decades been aligned with the Democratic Party, but that began to change after the 
Democrats nominated a Catholic (Kennedy) for president in 1960 and Republican nominee Goldwater 
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appealed strongly to their conservative views on social issues in 1964.  It continued into the 1970s as 
evangelicals saw traditional values continue to erode (Roe v. Wade, etc.) and mobilized in an effort to 
defend them.  This unfolded even as one of their own occupied the White House, but Jimmy Carter had 
disappointed them by his lack of enthusiasm in embracing their conservative social views.  Ironically, 
Carter had been elected in large part based on his ability to persuade more moderate voters who had been 
suspicious of evangelicals, while most of them had voted for Gerald Ford in 1976 (Wald & Calhoun-
Brown, 2018, Chapter 8).   
 At any rate, “[t]he Moral Majority appeared at about the same time that the actual majority was 
more and more comfortable with divorce and couples living together out of wedlock” (Gerson, 2018, p. 
48).  Still, evangelicals made the dramatic shift from avoiding politics to actively engaging.  Secular 
conservatives, seeing opportunity, began actively seeking to attract religious conservatives to a common 
cause.  Ronald Reagan courted them hard in 1980, and the Republican Party offered platform planks and 
prominent roles for evangelicals.  The shotgun wedding worked, and it bore fruit as evangelical leaders, 
who had been motivated primarily by moral issues like abortion and school prayer, began offering 
religious justification for conservative positions on a range of other issues.  “Thus, increased defense 
spending was a way to keep the nation free for the continued preaching of the Gospel, and support for the 
governments of Taiwan and South Africa was necessary to protect Christian allies from the ‘Godless 
forces of anti-Christ communism’” (Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2018, p. 198).  Some evangelicals, 
including Jerry Falwell, went even further, such as offering a religious basis for issues like balanced 
budgets and flat-rate taxation (Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2018, Chapter 8). 
 The Republican Party began to distance itself somewhat after Bill Clinton defeated George H. W. 
Bush in 1992, perhaps in no small part due to concerns on the part of moderate voters that evangelical 
influence over the party had gotten out of hand.  Being left at that point with few policy successes to show 
for two decades of activism plunged the evangelical political movement into a period of reflection.  What 
emerged was the conclusion that too much emphasis had been placed on national politics, which led to a 
new emphasis on electing friendly candidates to state and local office, together with actively developing 
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grassroots membership organizations to carry the flag.  In addition, efforts were made to tone down the 
group’s previously strident language and replace it with more neutral-sounding terms.  Thus, a group that 
many observers had presumed dead was able to find new political life (Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2018, 
Chapter 8). 
 Still, though, how do we get from there to Donald Trump?  In one sense, evangelical support of 
Trump was nothing new.  While it may have been a more extreme example, it was really just another 
verse of a hymn first sung more than three decades earlier.  Ronald Reagan certainly didn’t fit the part in 
terms of his personal history, yet evangelicals coalesced around him – even against one of their own – in 
1980.  “This would set a precedent for supporting candidates who might fall short of conservative 
Christian standards in their personal lives but pledged to support the movement’s agenda” (Wald and 
Calhoun-Brown, 2018, p. 198).  To evangelicals, words apparently speak louder than actions. 
 Another observer contends that “the evangelical road to Donald Trump” actually started earlier – 
much, much earlier.  Evangelical historian John Fea contends that, looking all the way back to the earliest 
English settlements in America, “…it is possible to write an entire history of American evangelicalism as 
the story of Christians who have failed to overcome fear…” (2018, p. 75).  Their fears led evangelicals to 
adopt an approach to public engagement rooted in their own anxiety.  This accelerated in more recent 
decades, thanks to developments like Roe v. Wade.  Then evangelicals had to deal with Barack Obama, 
who seemed to be the personification of many of their fears, and what appeared to be the very swift 
arrival of gay marriage.   
 During the 2016 campaign, candidates like Ted Cruz and, to a lesser extent, Marco Rubio stoked 
evangelical fears by painting a grim picture of what life would be like for them should the wrong 
candidate be elected.  Ironically, the fearmongering worked too well.  Evangelicals looked back at them 
through their anxiety and concluded they weren’t strong enough or mean enough to make an effective 
protector.  Another candidate was. 
 After clinching the Republican nomination, Trump worked hard to woo evangelicals.  According 
to Fea, his best move was to release a list of judges he would consider for the appointment should there be 
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a vacancy on the Supreme Court.  This struck a nerve with evangelicals, who in many ways saw the Court 
as the root of the assault on traditional values.  Still, it wasn’t at all clear whether they would rally to the 
support of a candidate as flawed as Trump. 
 Those doubts began to evaporate once Hillary Clinton secured the Democratic nomination.  She 
had been on evangelicals’ prayer lists since 1992, when her comments about staying home and baking 
cookies were interpreted as a rejection of traditional values.  By 2016 evangelicals considered her openly 
hostile on issues like abortion and gay marriage, while being ambivalent – at best – on other key issues 
like religious freedom.  Thus, forced to choose between “the strongman who paid lip service to their 
values and their age-old adversary in the culture wars,” many evangelicals felt they had no choice but to 
vote for Trump (Fea, 2018, p. 72). 
 Viewed from this perspective, it is reasonable to at least ponder whether the overwhelming 
evangelical votes for Trump were really the equivalent of overwhelming endorsement of Trump.  Ed 
Stetzer and Andrew MacDonald (2018, p. 21) contend that “…many of Trump’s evangelical voters were 
not enthusiastic about him as a candidate.”  Stetzer and MacDonald reached that conclusion based on data 
from a 2018 survey done by the Billy Graham Center Institute at Wheaton College.  The survey divided 
respondents into three categories: those who self-identified as evangelicals; those who were classified as 
evangelicals based on their agreement with certain belief statements; and those who fit neither of the first 
two categories.  Focusing on those who were classified as evangelical by belief, the primary factors cited 
for their vote in 2016 included things like the economy (17%) and health care (11%); factors like abortion 
and personal character of the candidate brought up the rear in single digits.  Thus, per Stetzer and 
MacDonald, evangelicals primarily cast their votes based more on traditionally Republican issues than 
conservative social issues.  Further, fully 75% of these evangelical voters expressed a willingness to vote 
for a Democratic candidate for president, with the caveat that he or she be considered pro-life.  Perhaps 
most telling, however, was the fact that only half of these voters said their vote was cast for a preferred 
candidate, while one-third said their vote was cast against a disfavored candidate (Clinton edged out 
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Trump here by a margin of 18%-15%).  Dissatisfied with both major candidates, one in five of these 
evangelicals did not vote in 2016. 
 What are we to make of this?  Are evangelicals the staunch Trump supporters some reports would 
have them to be?  According to one now-famous statistic, exit polling showed that fully 81% of white 
evangelicals cast their votes for him in 2016 (Martinez & Smith, 2016). 
 And what of the connection between evangelicals and the Republican Party more generally?  The 
linkage now appears to be well beyond the point where it has been accepted as gospel, even among 
political scientists (See, for example, Wilcox & Robinson, 2010; Mason, 2018; Putnam & Campbell, 
2010).  One scholar (Patrikios, 2013) contends that the connection has become so strong that evangelical 
and Republican have become a single, fused identity.  Thus, all evangelicals see themselves as 
Republicans and behave in ways such an identity would suggest. 
 While there is broad agreement that a connection exists, there is debate as to how the connection 
between evangelical and Republican actually works.  In other words, what is it about evangelicals that 
leads them to identify as Republicans?  Brint and Abrutyn (2010) identify five types of explanations: 
religiosity, moral standards traditionalism, gender and family ideology, class culture, and cultural 
geography.  Each of these will be considered in turn. 
 Essentially, religiosity is grounded in the observation that, in terms of their politics, religious 
people behave differently from those who are less religious (or even non-religious).  For example, 
Layman (2001) describes a religion-based “great divide” in the American public.  One side of this divide 
is made up of highly religious people, especially evangelicals, who have a strong focus on moral issues.  
The other side consists of those who are less religious (or even non-religious) who tend to emphasize 
social or economic issues.  Due to stances such as opposition to abortion, the former have gravitated 
toward the Republican Party, whereas the latter have gravitated toward the Democratic Party. 
 The basic argument of religiosity is that highly religious people emphasize their religious 
perspective to the degree that it shapes other aspects of life, such as politics.  In seeking to explore this 
connection, scholars focus on indicators such as frequency of church attendance and Bible reading.  Some 
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scholars, including Brint and Abrutyn, include components of beliefs, such as whether the Bible is the 
literal word of God.  Ultimately, the contention is that high levels of religiosity are associated with 
conservative positions on political issues and identification with the Republican Party. 
 Next, as described by Brint and Abrutyn, moral standards traditionalism is rooted in very clear 
ideas of right vs. wrong.  This means personal behavior should be governed by very strict guidelines.  
Adherents believe these guidelines should be applied to the entire society, regardless of whether some 
members may have differing moral views, and there is no room for adjustment.  These guidelines tend to 
be expressed in terms of traditional standards, which are seen as threatened by social change.  Thus, this 
perspective is associated with conservative political views.  This is measured by indicators such as 
whether moral guidelines should be adjusted to reflect societal changes and whether “newer lifestyles” 
generate societal decline. 
 Gender and family ideology, meanwhile, is rooted in differing views of the family unit and how it 
should function.  This approach rests on work such as that of Lakoff (2002).  Essentially, Lakoff explains 
the differing political ideologies of liberal and conservative in terms of “Strict Father Morality” versus 
“Nurturant Parent Morality.”  Not surprisingly, the “strict father” is associated with conservative, while 
the “nurturant parent” is associated with liberal.  Thus, for example, the strict father blocks access to 
abortion so that individuals are denied a means to escape the consequences for their actions that created 
the unintended pregnancy.   
 Brint and Abrutyn connect these concepts to evangelicals in a rather straightforward way.  The 
strict father approach becomes the corollary to the biblical description of the family.  This view highlights 
the predominant role of the husband relative to the wife, while children are expected to respect and obey 
parental authority.  Thus, since evangelicals are more likely to share this view of the family, gender and 
family ideology becomes a potential explanation for connecting evangelicals with conservative politics.  
This is measured by indicators such as views on the extent to which spouses should have equal roles in 
the home. 
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 Next, class culture is suggested as a potential explanation for the linkage between evangelicals 
and the Republican Party.  This is of particular applicability for white evangelicals.  While there continues 
to be some debate among scholars as to precisely how the connection works, the emphasis here is on 
lower levels of income and education.  This is especially true for whites, as lower levels of income and 
education make them the most vulnerable section of the predominant racial group.   
 While evangelicals look more like the rest of the population in these terms than they did once 
upon a time, gaps remain.  According to Greeley and Hout (2006, pp. 98-100), what they call 
“Conservative Protestants” do not compare favorably to other religious groups.  Only seventeen percent 
of them hold college degrees, a proportion just over half that of Catholics and mainline protestants and 
just under one-fourth the rate for Jews.  They are also more likely to hold blue-collar jobs than members 
of the other groups, and their family income lags by amounts ranging from around $8,000 per year to 
about $21,000 per year.  Brint and Abrutyn explore class culture using measures such as income and 
years of education. 
 Finally, cultural geography suggests that evangelicals tend to be Republican because of where 
they live.  Greeley and Hout (2006, pp. 92-93) note that a little more than half of Conservative Protestants 
live in the South.  Catholics and Jews tend to live in the Northeast, while the non-religious are relatively 
evenly distributed throughout the country.  In addition, Conservative Protestants demonstrate a marked 
tendency to not live in large metropolitan areas; in other words, they are much more likely to be found in 
small towns and rural areas. 
 As Brint and Abrutyn note, this is not insignificant, as rural areas tend to be more politically 
conservative, while urban areas tend to be more politically liberal.  They measure cultural geography 
using a dummy variable for whether the respondent lives in the South and indicators for residence in a 
small town or rural area. 
 Using a variety of conservative political positions as dependent variables, Brint and Abrutyn find 
a relatively mixed bag and conclude that “the conservative attitudes of white Christians in the United 
States are not due to membership in particular religious traditions, but rather to social circumstances and 
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value commitments that are found more often among them.  Low education levels, moral traditionalism, 
religiosity, and male-dominated gender role attitudes are the proximate causes of conservative political 
attitudes” (2010, p. 344).  However, while religious identity does not appear to be the predominant factor 
in adopting conservative political positions, it does appear to be more strongly linked to Republican 
identity. 
 This is important because, once adopted, partisan affiliation influences a host of political 
behaviors, including voting.  Of course, it is not possible to undertake a discussion of voting without 
considering The American Voter, the seminal work of Campbell et al. (1960).  Broadly speaking, 
American Voter undermines the idealistic notion of voters as informed citizens who study issues, 
investigate the positions of the candidates, and make rational voting decisions by voting for the candidate 
who best fits their own positions.  Indeed, the authors find that only about one in ten citizens can be said 
to be politically informed.  Instead, vote choice is driven largely by partisanship (party ID), which is 
largely affective and strongly linked to the party ID of one’s parents.  Party ID is not necessarily linked to 
the individual’s ideology and issues and frequently contradicts them.  The study is based on panel surveys 
of large numbers of voters in the 1950s, especially the Eisenhower elections of 1952 and 1956.  
Nonetheless, American Voter continues to profoundly shape contemporary research on vote choice.   
 More recently, Bafumi and Shapiro (2009) explore the contemporary impact of partisanship on 
vote choice.  They contend that, while it declined for a time, partisan voting is back in a big way.  
However, contemporary partisanship looks very different from that described in American Voter.  The 
1950s brand of partisanship was not based on ideology and issues but instead on affective attachment to a 
political party that frequently contradicted these fundamental concerns.  Contemporary partisanship, on 
the other hand, is strongly linked to these influences.  Thus, these days few liberals see themselves as 
Republicans, and few conservatives see themselves as Democrats.  More importantly, they are much more 
likely to vote accordingly. 
 To be fair, vote choice is complex and involves a variety of possible explanations.  For example, 
the political knowledge of the typical voter – or perhaps more correctly the lack thereof – continues to 
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generate research and debate.  Generally speaking, the fundamental question here is whether – despite 
their low information levels – voters can nonetheless somehow manage to vote effectively.  Popkin 
(1991) advocates for a low information rationality approach, which essentially contends that such voters 
can still manage to vote effectively based on information shortcuts (heuristics).  While they may not be 
well informed about politics, as they go about their lives people learn things that they can apply when 
needed in order to reach an appropriate decision even in the absence of high information levels.  For 
example, a voter who pays little attention to politics but knows that her pro-choice positions are her most 
important political values can fairly easily learn that these positions are advanced through voting for 
Democratic candidates.  This is facilitated by the parties working to give very clear cues regarding what 
their party emphasizes. 
 On the other hand, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) represent the contrary approach.  Essentially, 
this approach challenges the effectiveness of vote choice based on heuristics.  As Delli Carpini and Keeter 
point out, at least some threshold level of knowledge is required in order to use heuristics.  Without at 
least this basic level of knowledge, voters cannot determine what cues are appropriate to use and the 
circumstances under which they should be applied.  Further, more informed citizens are more likely to 
support democratic norms, make vote choices that better reflect their interests, etc. 
 In a more specific setting, Lupia (1994) conducted exit polls of voters in a 1988 California 
election including several ballot initiatives regarding insurance reform.  These were chosen specifically 
because they were low information issues that lacked ballot cues such as party and incumbency.  
Ultimately, Lupia finds that voters who were not too well informed on the issues but who knew one key 
piece of information – the position of the insurance industry – voted in ways that were very similar to 
voters who were well informed.  Thus, Lupia argues, low information voters are able to use information 
shortcuts well enough to participate as effectively as more informed voters (at least in terms of addressing 
their own interests). 
 Meanwhile, Bullock (2011) challenges the position that low information voters are more 
susceptible to manipulation by party elites.  Bullock conducts an experiment in which some respondents 
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are shown news articles with party cues, while others are shown articles including policy information.  He 
finds that policy information matters just as much as party cues – sometimes much more – with regard to 
the position subsequently taken by the respondent.  This means low information voters are not necessarily 
reduced to objects of manipulation by the party elites. 
 While we may be tempted to dismiss such a debate based on the assumption that it ultimately 
makes no difference in election outcomes, Bartels (1996) dispels this notion.  Analyzing presidential 
elections from 1972 to 1992, Bartels concludes that – relative to a fully informed electorate – low 
knowledge voters generated an average bump of two percentage points for Democrats and five percentage 
points for incumbents.  Thus, low knowledge voters present more than just an academic discussion. 
 These factors consider characteristics of the voter, but it is also useful to consider external factors.  
For purposes of this review, research on external factors impacting individual vote choice is condensed 
into the categories of candidates and campaigns, elite cues, the media, retrospective voting, and social 
networks.  Each of these will be considered in turn, but even this range of categories necessarily excludes 
a great deal of existing research. 
 The level of attention paid to candidates and campaigns – not to mention the amount of money 
spent on campaigns – belies the presumption that they matter in terms of vote choice.  Does empirical 
research support this presumption? 
 Druckman (2004) explores the impact of campaigns in the 2000 U.S. Senate election in 
Minnesota.  He conducts a content analysis of pre-election campaign coverage and exit polling of voters 
on election day.  The key finding is that, when asked to name the issues on which their vote choice was 
based, voters who had been attentive to the campaigns (as determined by their responses to exit polling 
questions) named issues that had in fact been emphasized by the campaigns, whereas inattentive voters 
named other issues.  Thus, Druckman concludes that campaigns do have a meaningful impact on vote 
choice. 
 Turning to candidate related cues, Arceneaux (2008) investigates the impact of issue positions 
taken by candidates.  More specifically, given the tendency of voters to rely on party based cues, 
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Arceneaux asks whether candidates generate backlash when they take positions contrary to the party line.  
Based on an experiment in which respondents are shown news articles with differing combinations of 
party cues and issue positions, he finds that voters do evaluate those candidates more harshly.  The 
likelihood of this increases as the salience of the issue and the information level of the voter increase. 
 Next, McDermott (1998) considers the impact of the candidate’s race and gender in low 
information elections.  Essentially, McDermott recognizes the value of party and incumbency as cues in 
such races but argues that race and gender cues should be added to the mix.  In a nutshell, her argument is 
that voters use race and gender based stereotypes to project candidates’ issue positions in order to choose 
the candidate that is closer to their own positions.  For example, voters think women are more liberal than 
men; thus, a liberal voter would choose the female candidate over the male candidate based on the 
presumption that she is the better match on issue positions. 
 Finally, Goren (2002 and 2007) examines the impact of perceived character weaknesses of 
presidential candidates using the character traits of competence, leadership, integrity, and empathy.  This 
is essentially a motivated reasoning argument (as in partisans looking for a reason not to like the 
candidate of the other party).  Ultimately, Goren concludes that this is especially likely to happen when 
the perceived weakness of the other candidate is the trait the partisan considers to be owned by her own 
party and when the other candidate is either the incumbent president running for reelection or the 
incumbent vice president running for president. 
 As for the media, Druckman (2005) uses content analysis of pre-election coverage and exit 
polling in the 2000 U.S. Senate race in Minnesota to explore the relative impact of newspaper versus 
television coverage on vote choice.  Overall, he finds that both mediums offer similar content but that the 
quantity of the coverage is quite different (newspapers offer more).  The key question, however, is 
whether this difference affects voters.  Based on exit poll responses, Druckman concludes that  newspaper 
coverage plays a significant role in informing voters but that television coverage does not. 
 While Druckman examines mainstream media, Levendusky (2013) explores the impact of 
partisan media.  Based in an experiment in which different groups of respondents were exposed to 
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excerpts from apolitical consistent, or cross-cutting programs, Levendusky concludes that exposure to 
partisan media outlets does impact voters.  More specifically, he concludes that such exposure causes 
individuals to have a more negative view of the other party, to trust the other party less, and to be less 
supportive of bipartisan approaches. 
 From a normative perspective, retrospective voting plays an important role in our political 
process.  By linking vote choice with past performance, it offers a way for elected officials and political 
parties to be held accountable for their actions.   
 Using survey data from elections in 1956 through 1974, Fiorina (1978) examines the 
conventional wisdom that people vote their pocketbooks.  That is, people vote for the president’s party 
when times are good but against it when times are bad.  More specifically, Fiorina explores whether there 
is a link between vote choice and personal economic circumstances.  He concludes that personal 
economic circumstances do in fact affect vote choice in presidential elections.  The same is true in 
congressional elections, but not after 1960.  In light of these findings, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
effect is stronger in presidential election years than in midterm election years.  On an interesting side 
note, personal economic circumstances are not found to affect whether an individual votes. 
 Moving the discussion forward about two decades, Fiorina et al. (2003) explore the impact of 
retrospective voting in the 2000 presidential election between Al Gore and George W. Bush.  The results 
of that election call the impact of retrospective voting into question, in that the traditional peace and 
prosperity perspective should have generated a significant electoral advantage for Gore.  Interestingly, the 
authors relate the results of an expert panel assembled at the annual meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, which was held about two months before the election.  On average, the assembled 
experts predicted that Gore would receive 56 percent of the popular vote on the way to a relatively easy 
win.  Obviously, we know in hindsight that Gore significantly underperformed these predictions, 
ultimately receiving barely over 50 percent of the popular vote and losing the electoral college – and the 
presidency – to Bush. 
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 While the authors’ discussion of how Gore’s shift to the left of Clinton’s centrist positions and 
similar issues ultimately lost votes is an interesting read, the key takeaway here concerns retrospective 
voting.  The authors conclude that it is not dead, but they remind us that it is only one factor in the voting 
equation and that its impact fluctuates from election to election. 
 Finally, this review of external factors turns to a consideration of how voting behavior may be 
impacted by the influence of other individuals with whom voters associate.  Klofstad et al. (2013) explore 
the impact of disagreement among one’s social network.  A key contention of these authors is that 
disagreement is not just disagreement; we must recognize and account for different types of disagreement.  
Persons exposed to partisan political disagreement tend to have stronger political preferences than those 
exposed to general political disagreement.  Moreover, general political disagreement has broader effects 
on individuals but – significantly – does not reduce turnout. 
 This last point specifically contradicts the conclusions of Mutz (2002).  She argues that exposure 
to disagreement in one’s social network matters, in no small part because it makes it less likely that the 
person will vote.  This results from a direct effect of discouraging participation and an indirect effect of 
generating greater ambivalence. 
 Of course, it cannot be overemphasized that partisanship affects political behavior in very broad 
and fundamental ways that extend beyond simply whether and for whom a person votes.  This is 
particularly true in light of the American Voter approach to partisanship.  While it can move to a degree, 
partisanship remains planted for the long term and shapes how people view the political world.  This is 
due in large part to partisanship being affective in nature, which means that it is adopted through more of 
an emotional attachment than a rational tallying up of the relative pros and cons of supporting a particular 
party.  Thus, it is not unusual for people to vote in ways that are contrary to previously held positions on 
issues in order to support their preferred party. 
 Further, people tend to alter their positions on political issues in order to accommodate their 
preferred party.  Dancey and Goren (2010) use National Election Studies data and content analysis of 
television news coverage to explore the impact of elites on the positions of voters on key issues during the 
15 
Clinton Administration.  They argue that elite debate generates increased coverage of an issue, which, in 
turn, causes voters to tune in to the debate and update their own positions.  Thus, elite debate provides a 
mechanism that helps voters keep their issue positions up to date with their preferred party.  In the 
absence of elite debate, such reevaluation does not occur, and voters’ positions remain dormant.   
 Levendusky (2010b) reaches similar results.  Based on an experiment in which some respondents 
were given elite cues on issues before being asked to state their own position while other respondents 
were not, Levendusky concludes that elite cues cause voters to reexamine their own positions and adopt 
more consistent attitudes.  Again, the significance here is that people tend to adapt their issue positions to 
conform with their preferred party; they do not choose their preferred party based on their pre-existing 
issue positions. 
 Finally, Nicholson (2012) examines the impact of out-party leaders.  People create in-groups and 
out-groups to help them organize and understand their world.  In the political realm this translates to 
parties: the individual’s chosen party (in-group) and the opposing party (out-group).  Nicholson’s core 
argument is that party leaders impact voters more than party labels.  Using experimental questions 
embedded within a survey of the 2008 presidential election, Nicholson’s key finding is that partisans 
adapt their own positions so that they are opposite positions taken by the out-party leader but that the 
party label itself does not generate such reevaluation.  Thus, if you want to get people in rural Georgia to 
support something, just show them a clip of Nancy Pelosi talking about how much she hates it! 
 The net result of all of this is that the electorate has become much better sorted than it was once 
upon a time.  While The American Voter described a population who routinely voted in ways that were 
contrary to their own issue positions, that is much less frequent today.  Per Levendusky (2010a), this is a 
consequence of people increasingly adapting their issue positions to match their preferred party, even 
though the other party might actually be a closer fit for their own interests.  This is exacerbated by 
exposure to partisan media (which Levendusky says increases disdain for the out-party) and the fact that 
many people now selectively expose themselves only to comparable media sources (thus creating an 
“echo chamber”). 
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 More recently, Lilliana Mason (2018) explores the continuing impact of partisanship.  
Essentially, Mason sees contemporary partisanship as a “mega-identity.”  That is, all individuals hold a 
variety of identities – racial, religious, partisan, etc.  Historically, some of these identities tended to create 
cross-cutting cleavages, in that they acted to moderate the effects of partisanship.  More recently, 
however, these other identities have become aligned with one or the other partisan identities.  The result 
of this alignment is that, instead of acting to moderate the effects of partisanship, aligned identities 
reinforce and exacerbate partisanship.   
 Further, identity is a social phenomenon, not one driven by issue content.  Thus, for example, 
behavior is driven by the fact that people see themselves as conservatives, not by whether they actually 
hold conservative positions.   Indeed, while they likely do not realize it and are highly offended at the 
mere suggestion, most people modify their issue positions to maintain congruence with their partisan 
identity.  This is reinforced by the modern ability to consume information only from “friendly” sources, 
which allows people to completely avoid exposure to information that may challenge their existing views.  
Thus, contemporary political behavior has become identity-driven and highly partisan, utterly unfettered 
by facts and issue content. 
 Mason identifies clear patterns of identities that align with partisanship.  Perhaps chief among 
them is race: “[t]he parties have grown so divided by race that simple racial identity, without policy 
content, is enough to predict party identity” (2018, p. 33).  Religion is another key factor: “[t]he 
Republican Party became firmly affiliated with conservative Christianity,” which led people to further 
define their partisanship in terms of whether they shared that religious identity (2018, p. 33).  Ultimately, 
then, white evangelicals have come to see themselves as staunch Republicans, while African-Americans 
and the non-religious (and perhaps those from more moderate religious traditions) consider themselves 
Democrats, even though some of these groups do not appear to be all that different from white 
evangelicals from a religious perspective.  Indeed, African-Americans and Latinos have been described as 
more deeply religious than whites (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). 
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 The idea that evangelical identity appears to manifest itself differently among whites than among 
non-whites has not escaped the notice of other scholars.  For example, McKenzie and Rouse (2013) 
explore differing levels of interest in egalitarian issues among white, black, and Latino religious groups.  
The issues included overcoming discrimination against women, reducing intolerance toward 
homosexuals, policies to assist the poor, and policies to achieve racial parity.  As might be expected, the 
level of interest among those considered religiously conservative varied across groups.  Whites were less 
interested in all of these issues.  Latinos were less interested in the gender discrimination and intolerance 
toward homosexuals issues, whereas blacks were less interested only in the intolerance toward 
homosexuals issue.  McKenzie and Rouse contend that these variations are explained by the fact that, 
even among those with religiously conservative beliefs, religion is experienced in different cultural 
settings across the groups. 
 More recently, Wong (2018) explores differing levels of support for conservative political 
positions among White and non-White evangelicals within the context of the 2016 presidential election.  
She finds that Whites are consistently more conservative – and more Republican - than their non-White 
counterparts across a range of political issues.  Wong contends that this is explained by high levels of “in-
group embattlement” among Whites, which basically means that their political behavior is largely 
motivated by the desire to resist demographic changes they see unfolding in American society. 
 For an even broader context, McAdams and Lance (2013) compare the political behavior of 
American evangelicals with their counterparts in Brazil.  While the two groups look quite similar in their 
positions on moral issues like abortion and gay marriage (Brazilian evangelicals are notably even more 
staunchly opposed to abortion), Brazilian evangelicals otherwise appear somewhat more moderate to 
liberal in their politics, such as party identification.  This suggests that the political context within which 
individual adherents live out their daily lives also plays an important role in how they view the connection 
between their religion and their politics. 
 Where, then, does this leave us with regard to white evangelicals?  In reality, what is the nature of 
the relationship between their evangelical identity and their political behavior?  Many of the perspectives 
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described above offer meaningful contributions, yet they fail to fully connect the dots.  I would suggest 
that a large part of why we struggle with this question is that we have built up a conventional wisdom 
around evangelicals that is simply not accurate. 
 This has caused us to view white evangelicals as salmon.  That is, we see them as single-minded 
and doggedly determined to go their own way – upstream – no matter what is going on in the political 
environment around them.  Instead, I would suggest that we might better understand them if we come to 
recognize that they have quite a bit of chameleon in them.   
 In other words, I contend that the fundamental flaw that leads to our misunderstanding of white 
evangelicals is that we erroneously think that their religion dictates their politics.  We think this because 
there are validity problems with the criteria we use in reaching that conclusion.  They tell us in our 
surveys of their high degree of religiosity, which largely means level of religious observance (frequency 
of church attendance, for example) and that their faith is very important to them.  Our error lies in taking 
these things to mean that their religion must dictate their politics.  In doing so, we have conflated two 
related – yet distinctly separate – things.  More specifically, we equate these things with high levels of 
spiritual maturity, which is what we actually need to understand.  I contend that it is not only possible - 
but very common - for individuals to be highly observant yet still have a very superficial and immature 
faith perspective, at least as applied to politics.  The evangelical word is “discipleship,” which essentially 
means that believers should strive to become more Christ-like and allow their faith to shape all areas of 
their lives.  In reality, however, few approach such a standard.  This means that – for many of them – their 
political behavior is shaped more by their own preferences and the political environment around them 
than by their faith perspective.  Thus, to use Mason’s parlance, their religion fails to mitigate their 
partisanship because they never reach the point in their faith journey at which they truly make their 
politics subject to their faith.  Indeed, while many of them manage to convince themselves that their 
political behavior is simply an extension of their faith, in reality the opposite is true.  Like Mason’s 
partisans, they not only fail to recognize this but become defensive and enraged at the very suggestion.  
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Ultimately, this is why we continue to struggle with questions like why it is that Non-White and White 
Evangelicals – despite their religious similarities – are so different in their politics. 
 How, then, do we go about seeking to disentangle the relationship between evangelical identity 
and political behavior?  The essence of the contention here is rather straightforward.  If evangelical 
identity really is the predominant determinant of political behavior, it stands to reason that it should have 
a larger effect than other relevant variables on those outcomes.  This may not be true all the time, but it 
should be true at least much of the time.  In testing this contention, the analysis will be somewhat 
informal, in that it will not involve directly comparing coefficients to each other.  Rather, the analysis will 
be more holistic in nature in that it will consider the overall impact of the relevant variables relative to 
each other.   
 Due to its sheer size, including numerous respondents from every state and its inclusion of many 
useful indicators, the analysis will be conducted using an augmented version of the common content 
section of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2017).  This 
data set includes a total of 64,600 respondents, with just under 9,000 of them self-identifying as white 
evangelicals.  Since the data set identifies the county of residence for each respondent, it can be 
augmented with a variety of county-level indicators to explore the impact of environmental factors.  This 
will be done using 2016 ACS estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau (United States Census Bureau, 2016). 
The dependent variables to be used reflect a variety of measures of political behavior in three basic 
groups.  The first group includes variables that are direct indicators of political behavior; the second 
group includes variables for which certain positions are commonly associated with evangelicals; and the 
third group includes variables for which positions routinely follow ideological – although not necessarily 
religious – dimensions. 
 While the specific variables are explained more fully in Chapter Two, the first group includes 
whether respondents voted for Donald Trump in 2016 and a measure of party identification.  The second 
group includes whether respondents support gay marriage and whether they support a pro-life position.  
The third group includes measures for gun control (whether respondents support a ban on assault rifles), 
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immigration (whether respondents support legal status for “Dreamers”), and racism (whether respondents 
consider racial problems in the United States to be rare, isolated situations). 
 As indicated above, the essential contention here is that evangelical identity is not the primary 
determinant of any of these behaviors and that it is outweighed by other relevant factors.  Thus, the 
hypotheses to be tested can be expressed as follows: 
H1: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant in voting for Donald Trump and is 
outweighed by other relevant variables. 
 
H2: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of party identification and is 
outweighed by other relevant variables. 
 
H3: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of support for gay marriage and is 
outweighed by other relevant variables. 
 
H4: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of support for a pro-life position 
and is outweighed by other relevant variables. 
 
H5: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of support for a ban on assault 
rifles and is outweighed by other relevant variables. 
 
H6: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of support for legal status for 
Dreamers and is outweighed by other relevant variables. 
 
H7: Evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of believing that racial problems 
in the United States are rare, isolated situations and is outweighed by other relevant 
variables. 
 
 Thus, these hypotheses will be supported if the results of the models indicate that, on the whole, 
other relevant variables have a larger overall impact than evangelical identity on the outcomes.  
Conversely, these hypotheses will not be supported if the results indicate that, on the whole, evangelical 
identity has a larger overall impact than other relevant variables on the outcomes.   
 Moving forward, Chapter Two explains the variables to be used and presents the results of the 
Level 1 models.  Chapter Three adds the Level 2 variables and presents the results of those models.  
Chapter Four turns the tables a bit by using the measures of evangelical identity as dependent variables 
instead of independent variables and exploring the relative impact of the other relevant variables on the 
adoption of these identities.  Finally, Chapter Five discusses conclusions and suggestions for future 
research. 
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2 EFFECTS OF EVANGELICAL IDENTITY 
 As explained in Chapter One, the essential contention here is that evangelical identity is not the 
primary determinant of political behavior and is likely outweighed by other factors such as race, 
education, etc., including variables at both the individual and county level.  The data set used here is the 
common content section of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (Ansolabehere & 
Schaffner, 2017).  This data set was chosen because it includes measures that are useful for all of the 
variables discussed below and because it is a very large data set, including a total of 64,600 respondents.  
Thus, it allows analyses to be conducted on a scale somewhat larger than possible with many other data 
sets.  The 2016 survey is used due to the importance of exploring evangelical support for Donald Trump.  
Also, because the data set includes the county of residence of the respondents, it can be augmented with 
county level indicators.  This will be discussed more fully in Chapter Three, in which Level 2 variables 
will be added to the models. 
 The Level 1 variables that will be used here can be divided into three groups.  These are measures 
of evangelical identity (independent variables), measures of political behavior (dependent variables), and 
measures of demographic factors such as race and education (control variables).  Each group is addressed 
in the following discussion. 
 Evangelical Identity.  Because evangelical identity is so central to the contentions presented here, 
it is appropriate to begin with these measures.  The approach used here draws heavily on the work of 
Burge and Lewis (2018).  As explained by Burge and Lewis, measuring “evangelical” for research 
purposes is not nearly as simple as it might at first appear.  The two major approaches employed by 
existing research are the self-identification and affiliation approaches.  The self-identification approach 
largely hinges on asking respondents the standard question of whether they consider themselves to be 
born-again or evangelical Christians.  However, noting some examples of other research that developed 
problems from stopping with this one question, Burge and Lewis recommend pairing it with a second 
question to determine whether respondents also consider themselves to be Protestant.  Thus, per Burge 
and Lewis, respondents should be classified as Evangelical if they self-identity as both born-again and 
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Protestant.  In addition, in order to avoid conflating Evangelicals with Black Protestants (one of the other 
major religious traditions included in the RELTRAD approach below), Burge and Lewis contend that a 
control for race should be included that essentially removes Black respondents.   
 In compliance with these recommendations, the Evangelical measure used here is a binary one 
that classifies respondents as evangelical if they answer “yes” to the question asking “Would you describe 
yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian, or not?” (pew_bornagain) and “Protestant” to the 
question asking “What is your present religion, if any?” (religpew).  The race control is addressed by 
running each model once with all respondents included and once with Black respondents removed; the 
results for both versions are presented. 
 The affiliation approach is based on the work of Steensland et. al. (2000), which evaluates the 
belief structure of the religious tradition with which respondents are affiliated in order to determine 
whether they should be classified as evangelical.  This is known as the RELTRAD approach, and, as 
noted by Burge and Lewis, it is the predominant approach in contemporary usage.  Using the possible 
choices for religious affiliation available to respondents in the data set, there are respondents who state an 
affiliation with twenty traditions considered to be evangelical under the RELTRAD approach.  However, 
since the majority of these are small (particularly in relation to the total number of respondents in the 
survey), the analyses here are based on the six largest such groups as measured by the number of 
respondents who state an affiliation with the group.  The six (in no particular order) are Church of Christ, 
Lutheran Missouri, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, American Baptist, and Other 
Baptist.  All of these are binary measures based on whether respondents indicate an affiliation with each 
group in response to the appropriate questions. 
 Still, there is a challenging group that is not effectively addressed by the RELTRAD approach: 
Nondenominational Evangelicals.  From the RELTRAD perspective, this group is particularly 
challenging because – by definition – nondenominational evangelical congregations are generally not 
affiliated with a larger religious tradition.  Thus, it is not possible to evaluate them in reference to a larger, 
shared set of beliefs, as that may actually vary quite a bit from local congregation to local congregation.  
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It is tempting to simply ignore them, but this is difficult due not only to the fact that they use the term 
“evangelical” to describe themselves but also because they make up one of the largest groups, second 
only to Southern Baptists in the number of respondents included.  Ultimately, they are included in the 
models as a separate measure of evangelical identity, and the results are reported alongside those of the 
other groups. 
 Not surprisingly, these differing approaches to measuring evangelical identity make things a bit 
messy, especially in this chapter.  This is true because accommodating the various approaches requires 
running each of seven models (one for each dependent variable explained below) three different times, 
one each for Evangelical, Evangelical / Black respondents removed, and RELTRAD.  The models are 
identical but for the evangelical measures used, and the results are presented alongside each other for 
comparison. 
 Control Variables.  As suggested above, the control variables are essentially demographic 
measures that describe personal characteristics of the respondent.  As such, they do not require elaborate 
explanation. 
 Age is respondent’s age, which is calculated by subtracting respondent’s year of birth (birthyr) 
from 2016 (the year in which the survey was conducted).  While it is true that this may result in missing 
the correct age by one year, depending on whether the respondent’s birthday happened to fall before or 
after participating in the survey, this does not generate any issues of concern. 
 Education is respondent’s level of education.  It is based on a six point scale (educ) including no 
high school; high school graduate; some college; two year degree; four year degree; and post-graduate.  
Higher values indicate higher education levels. 
 Party ID is respondent’s preferred political party.  It is based on a seven point scale (pid7) ranging 
from Strong Democrat (1) to Strong Republican (7).  Thus, higher values represent stronger Republican 
identification. 
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 Male is a binary indicator of gender.  It is recoded from a basic gender question (gender) so that it 
is coded 1 if respondent is male and 0 if not.  The recoding reflects the expectation that males are more 
likely to behave in certain ways, such as voting for Donald Trump and identifying as Republican. 
 White is a binary indicator of race.  It is recoded from a basic race question (race) so that it is 
coded 1 if respondent is White and 0 if not.  The recoding reflects the expectation that Whites are more 
likely to behave in certain ways, such as voting for Donald Trump and identifying as Republican. 
 Church Regular is a binary indicator of how frequently respondent attends religious services aside 
from weddings and funerals.  It is recoded from a seven point scale about church attendance 
(pew_churatd) so that it is coded 1 if respondent attends church at least once a week and 0 if not.  The 
recoding reflects the expectation that regular church attenders may be more likely to behave in certain 
ways, such as voting for Donald Trump and identifying as Republican. 
 Dependent Variables.  There are a total of seven dependent variables loosely understood to 
belong in one of three subgroups.  The first subgroup (Trump Vote and Party ID) is intended to address 
overtly political behavior.  The second subgroup (Abortion and Gay Marriage) is intended to address 
policy issues that normally have a strong association with evangelicals.  The third subgroup (Gun Control, 
Immigration, and Racism) is intended to address policy issues that normally reflect an ideological 
dimension but not necessarily a religious dimension.  Each of the variables is addressed in turn below. 
 Trump Vote is a binary measure coded 1 if the respondent voted for Donald Trump in 2016 and 0 
if the respondent voted for a different candidate.  It has been recoded from a question about presidential 
vote choice (CC16_410a), and respondents who declined to reveal their vote choice or who were not 
asked this question because they did not vote in 2016 are dropped from the sample. 
 Party ID is a seven point scale measuring respondent’s preferred political party (pid7).  Values 
range from Strong Democrat (1) to Strong Republican (7).  Thus, higher values represent stronger 
Republican identification, whereas lower values represent stronger Democratic identification.  Of course, 
since the measure is used in different ways in different models, Party ID is not included as an independent 
variable in models in which it is the dependent variable. 
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 Gay Marriage is a binary measure that simply asks respondents whether they support allowing 
gays and lesbians to marry legally (CC16_335).  It has been recoded 1 for respondents who support gay 
marriage and 0 for respondents who oppose it.  Of course, this is a policy issue strongly associated with 
evangelicals, and they are expected to demonstrate less support than other respondents. 
 Pro-Life is a binary measure that asks respondents whether they support a policy that permits 
abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger (CC16_332b).  It has been 
recoded 1 for respondents who support the policy and 0 for those who do not.  Along with gay marriage, 
this is a policy issue strongly associated with evangelicals, and they are expected to be more supportive of 
the policy than other respondents. 
 Dreamer is a binary measure that asks respondents whether they support granting legal status to 
persons who were brought to the United States illegally as children but have since graduated from high 
school in the United States (CC16_331_3).  It has been recoded as 1 for respondents who support the 
policy and 0 for those who do not.  This particular immigration question was chosen in order to explore 
whether the sympathetic aspect (emphasizing children) leads evangelicals to adopt a softer (as in less 
politically conservative) stance than other respondents. 
 Assault Rifle Ban is a binary measure that asks respondents whether they support a ban on assault 
rifles (CC16_330d).  It has been recoded as 1 for respondents who support such a ban and 0 for those who 
do not.  This measure was chosen because such a ban is popular (roughly two-thirds of all respondents 
support it), so it creates an opportunity to see whether evangelicals take a more politically conservative 
position than other respondents. 
 Racism asks respondents to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the statement that racial 
problems in the United States are rare, isolated situations (CC16_422f).  It is a five point scale that has 
been recoded so that 1 represents Strongly Disagree and 5 represents strongly agree.  This measure was 
chosen because it essentially extends respondents an opportunity to deny that racism is a problem in the 
United States without expressly saying so.  Thus, it allows an opportunity to see whether evangelicals 
take a more politically conservative position than other respondents. 
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 Models.  Finally, it is appropriate to offer a brief description of the models used before 
proceeding to the analyses.  Most of the dependent variables are binary (Trump Vote, Gay Marriage, Pro-
Life, Assault Rifle Ban, and Dreamer), so logit models are used in those cases.  Cells in the results tables 
for those models report marginal effects, predicted probabilities, and p values.  Regression models are 
used for the remaining dependent variables (Party ID and Racism).  Cells in the results tables for those 
models present regression coefficients, predicted values, and p values.   
 Having covered these basics, the remainder of the chapter presents and discusses the results of the 
models.  The order of the presentation essentially tracks the three subgroups of dependent variables as 
described above, with separate sections for primary effects of evangelical identity, interaction effects of 
evangelical identity, and effects of the control variables. 
 
2.1 Primary Effects of Evangelical Identity 
 Trump Vote and Party ID.  As described above, the first subgroup of dependent variables 
represents overtly political behavior.  Results for the primary effects of evangelical identity on Trump 
Vote and Party ID are presented in Table 2.1.  Shaded cells represent p > .05. 
 Turning first to Trump Vote, of immediate interest is the fact that a majority of these measures – 
five out of nine – do not approach statistical significance at the p > .05 level.  Of the remaining four, three 
do achieve high levels of significance, while one at least reaches the p > .10 level.  The one is Lutheran 
Missouri (p > 0.085), which increases the probability of voting for Trump by a little under three percent.  
The final three are split, with Nondenominational Evangelicals being almost seven percent more likely to 
vote for Trump.  Significantly, the broader measures of evangelical identity (both with and without Black 
respondents being included) are negative, meaning they reduce the probability of voting for Trump by 
almost four percent.  In addition, none of these measures changes the predicted outcome, as none of them 
move the predicted probability of voting for Trump past the .500 level in either direction. 
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(p > 0.000) 
-.576 
3.481/3.917 




(p > 0.003) 
.285 
3.694/4.153 
(p > 0.000) 
Church of Christ 
-.027 
.417/.390 
(p > 0.690) 
.087 
3.560/3.360 




(p > 0.085) 
1.179 
3.547/4.435 





(p > 0.000) 
.739 
3.525/4.616 
(p > 0.000) 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God 
.099 
.416/.515 
(p > 0.547) 
1.135 
3.548/4.559 




(p > 0.149) 
-.345 
3.526/4.259 




(p > 0.330) 
-.594 
3.560/3.685 




(p > 0.518) 
-.709 
3.556/3.951 
(p > 0.000) 
 
 The results for Party ID are more pronounced, however.  Note that all but one of these measures 
(Church of Christ) are very highly significant (p > 0.000).  In addition, as indicated by the predicted 
values, all of these make respondents more Republican than respondents who do not identify with any of 
these categories, but the effects are so modest that only about half of them change the predicted outcome.  
Evangelical / Black respondents removed, Lutheran Missouri, Nondenominational Evangelical, 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God, and Southern Baptist all make respondents one level more Republican on 
the Party ID scale.  Even then, however, the highest predicted value is a four, which equates to 
Independent on the seven point Party ID scale. 
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 Overall, these results suggest that the primary effects of evangelical identity on the overtly 
political dependent variables are much smaller than conventional wisdom might have suggested.  Two of 
the three statistically significant measures (both of the broad Evangelical measures) actually have a 
negative effect on the probability of voting for Donald Trump, and none of them changes the predicted 
outcome.  The effects on Party ID are stronger, with all but one of the evangelical identity measures being 
highly statistically significant.  Even then, however, the magnitude of the effects is very modest.  While 
five of them make respondents one level more Republican, none of them manage to produce a predicted 
value that reaches even the weakest level of Republican on the Party ID scale. 
 Gay Marriage and Pro-Life.  The next subgroup of dependent variables represents “hot-button” 
social issues for which Evangelicals are strongly associated with certain positions.  Results for the 
primary effects of evangelical identity on Gay Marriage and Pro-Life are presented in Table 2.2.  Again, 
shaded cells represent p > .05. 
 Two points are readily apparent from the results for Gay Marriage.  First, the majority – though 
not all – of the evangelical identity measures achieve statistical significance at a high level.  Second, all of 
the ones that do so have a negative effect on support for gay marriage. 
 However, looking beyond these broader points reveals – yet again – that the impact of evangelical 
identity is somewhat modest.  Of the six measures that fit the two points above, only two of them 
(Nondenominational Evangelical and Pentecostal Assemblies of God) reduce the predicted probability of 
supporting gay marriage from above to below the .500 level.  None of the Baptist categories – including 
the traditionally conservative Southern Baptists – fall below the .500 level (although Southern Baptist 
does come very close), while the broader Evangelical measure has little effect at all. 
 Abortion is another issue strongly associated with Evangelicals.  As discussed at the beginning of 
the chapter, recall that the abortion measure used here asks respondents whether they support the policy 
position of prohibiting abortion except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life. 
As with Gay Marriage, six of the nine measures of evangelical identity achieve high levels of statistical 
significance.  Evangelical / Black respondents removed actually reduces predicted support for the Pro-
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Life position, while the other five all have positive effects.  Four of these five (Nondenominational 
Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, and American Baptist) increase the 
predicted probability of supporting the Pro-Life position from below to above the .500 level, while the 
fifth (Other Baptist at .499) barely misses. 
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 Looking at these effects overall, six of the nine measures of evangelical identity achieve 
statistical significance for each of these dependent variables.  As expected, with the exception of 
Evangelical / Black respondents removed for Pro-Life, the effects are negative for Gay Marriage and 
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positive for Pro-Life.  Six of the effects (two for Gay Marriage and four for Pro-Life) move the predicted 
probability past the .500 level. 
 Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, and Racism.  The final subgroup of dependent variables represents 
issues for which positions may tend to break down along ideological – although not necessarily religious - 
dimensions.  Results for the primary effects of evangelical identity on Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, and 
Racism are presented in Table 2.3.  Again, shaded cells represent p > .05. 








(p > 0.006) 
.047 
.464/.511 
(p > 0.003) 
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(p > 0.916) 
.049 
.456/.505 
(p > 0.001) 
-.166 
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(p > 0.001) 
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.018 
.666/.684 
(p > 0.824) 
.023 
.474/.497 
(p > 0.081) 
.149 
2.282/2.249 
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2.280/2.418 
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- .030 
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(p > 0.928) 
.001 
.474/.475 
(p > 0.836) 
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(p > 0.986) 
- .066 
.477/.411 
(p > 0.000) 
.084 
2.279/2.367 




(p > 0.610) 
- .038 
.475/.437 
(p > 0.001) 
.265 
2.279/2.509 




(p > 0.351) 
- .084 
.476/.392 
(p > 0.000) 
-.008 
2.281/2.347 
(p > 0.906) 
 
 The primary effects – or perhaps more correctly non-effects – of evangelical identity on Assault 
Rifle Ban are rather straightforward.  Only two of the nine measures reach statistical significance, and 
they present mixed results.  Evangelical has a small positive effect on support for the ban, while 
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Nondenominational Evangelical has a modest negative effect.  However, perhaps due to what appears to 
be a rather strong level of support overall, neither of them changes the predicted outcome. 
 As for Dreamer, recall that the measure used here asks respondents whether they support legal 
status for persons brought to the United States illegally as children but who have since graduated from 
high school in the United States.  These results are a bit more promising, with six out of the nine 
measures reaching statistical significance.  Interestingly, both of the broader Evangelical measures 
increase support, while all four of the RELTRAD measures have negative effects.  However, only the two 
broader Evangelical measures move the predicted probability of support past the .500 level in either 
direction. 
 The final issue in this subgroup is Racism.  As explained at the beginning of the chapter, the 
measure used asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement that racial 
problems in the United States are rare, isolated situations.  Higher values indicate stronger agreement with 
the statement, indicating that the respondent does not consider racism to be a widespread problem.   
As can be seen, less than half of these measures (four out of nine) are statistically significant.  Both of the 
broader Evangelical measures have negative effects, suggesting that these respondents are more likely to 
see racism as a problem, while both of the RELTRAD measures have positive effects.  However, none of 
them change the predicted value on the five point Racism scale. 
 Looking at the evangelical identity effects for this subgroup overall, the measures reach statistical 
significance less than half the time (12/27).  Further, the evangelical measures change the predicted 
outcome only twice, with both of those being the broader Evangelical measures on Dreamer.  Notably, 
however, the broader Evangelical measures consistently produce more liberal positions, while – with one 
exception – the RELTRAD measures produce more conservative positions. 
 Looking at the effects across all seven dependent variables, the evangelical measures reach 
statistical significance only 55.5% of the time (35/63) and change the predicted outcome only 20.6% of 
the time (13/63).  In addition, the thirteen instances of predicted outcome change are quite concentrated, 
with five of them coming through increasing the predicted probability of supporting the Pro-Life position 
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from below to above the .500 level and four more through making respondents one level more Republican 
on the Party ID scale (although even then failing to generate a predicted value higher than Independent on 
the seven point scale).  All things considered, then, suggesting that the primary effects of evangelical 
identity fail to produce a strong impact in these results would be something of an understatement.   
 However, it is always possible that the interaction effects of evangelical identity could produce 
stronger results.  The analysis proceeds to those results in the next section. 
2.2 Interaction Effects of Evangelical Identity 
 It is not feasible to consolidate the tables showing interaction effects in the same manner as the 
tables showing primary effects, so these results will be presented in a separate table for each dependent 
variable.  However, the subgroups of dependent variables will be maintained as before. 
 Trump Vote and Party ID.  Interaction effects of evangelical identity with White and Church 
Regular for Trump Vote and Party ID are presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.  As before, shaded cells 
represent p > .05. 
 Turning first to Trump Vote, the interaction effects achieve statistical significance only 55.5% of 
the time (20/36) and change the predicted outcome only 11.1% of the time (4/36).  All four of the 
predicted outcome changes occur through the interaction with White, for which Pentecostal Assemblies of 
God, Southern Baptist, American Baptist, and Other Baptist all increase the predicted probability of 
voting for Trump from below to above the .500 level.  Notably, Southern Baptist makes both Whites and 
Non-Whites more likely to vote for Trump (although the effect is about four times as large for Whites), 
while the other three have positive effects for Whites but negative effects for Non-Whites.  This suggests 
that race is an important factor here, and it will be revisited during the discussion regarding control 
variables.  These results are shown in Figures 2.1 – 2.4. 
 While none of the interaction effects with Church Regular change the predicted outcome, it is 
interesting to note that the effects for the broader Evangelical measures are consistently negative and 
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roughly twice as large for Church Regulars than for Non-Church Regulars.  On the other hand, the 
RELTRAD effects are mostly positive and consistently larger for Non-Church Regulars. 
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.000 
.555/.555 
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Pentecostal Assemblies of God 
-.007 
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(p > 0.002) 
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.474/.604 
(p > 0.002) 
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.363/.442 
(p > 0.718) 
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.065 
.365/.430 
(p > 0.052) 
-.026 
.556/.530 




(p > 0.022) 
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.040 
.365/.405 
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.005 
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(p > 0.000) 
1.417 
3.732/4.565 
(p > 0.000) 
-.032 
3.336/3.804 
(p > 0.465) 
-.032 
3.887/4.236 




(p > 0.000) 
.226 
3.797/4.297 
(p > 0.000) 
-.045 
3.499/3.970 
(p > 0.344) 
-.045 
4.284/4.708 
(p > 0.344) 
Church of Christ 
-.075 
2.701/2.518 
(p > 0.778) 
-.075 
3.893/3.687 
(p > 0.778 
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3.386/3.419 
(p > 0.000) 
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4.048/3.197 




(p > 0.116) 
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3.878/4.661 
(p > 0.116) 
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(p > 0.640) 
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4.029/4.880 




(p > 0.000) 
.565 
3.853/5.105 
(p > 0.000) 
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3.368/4.523 
(p > 0.026) 
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3.967/4.877 
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-.235 
2.691/3.878 
(p > 0.251) 
-.235 
3.881/4.824 
(p > 0.251) 
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3.382/4.344 
(p > 0.330) 
.171 
4.016/5.163 




(p > 0.000) 
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3.840/5.007 
(p > 0.000) 
-.132 
3.362/4.155 
(p > 0.093) 
-.132 
3.986/4.552 




(p > 0.000) 
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3.888/4.367 
(p > 0.000) 
-.635 
3.386/3.697 
(p > 0.000) 
-.635 
4.050/3.650 




(p > 0.000) 
1.539 
3.880/4.705 
(p > 0.000) 
-.018 
3.384/3.808 
(p > 0.887) 
-.018 
4.041/4.353 
(p > 0.887) 
 
 As shown in Table 2.5, the interaction effects of evangelical identity on Party ID reach statistical 
significance 50.0% of the time (18/36) and change the predicted outcome 33.3% of the time (12/36).  The 
predicted outcome changes are very concentrated, however, with half of them coming from evangelical 
identity making Whites more Republican.  Four of the evangelical measures (Evangelical, Evangelical / 
Black respondents removed, American Baptist, and Other Baptist) make Whites one level more 
Republican.  Nondenominational Evangelical and Southern Baptist make Whites two levels more 
Republican, although the predicted value is barely beyond the Independent level on the seven point scale.  
These are the most significant impacts and are shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6.  As for Non-Whites, 
Nondenominational Evangelical makes them one level more Republican, while American Baptist makes 
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them one level less Republican.  Thus, American Baptist has a negative effect on Non-Whites but a 
positive effect on Whites (Figure 2.7). 
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Figure 2.7 Interaction of American Baptist over White - Party ID 
 
 The interaction effects with Church Regular (those who attend church at least weekly) are more 
muted.  Both Church of Christ and American Baptist make Church Regulars one level less Republican, 
while Nondenominational Evangelical makes both Church Regulars and Non-Church Regulars one level 
more Republican.  Interestingly, while the predicted value for Non-Church Regulars does not change, the 
effects of American Baptist are such that Church Regulars end up being slightly less Republican than 
Non-Church Regulars (Figure 2.8). 
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 Overall, as with Trump Vote, race seems to be a factor of interest.  The most notable results here 
lie in several measures of evangelical identity making respondents more Republican, with 
Nondenominational Evangelical and Southern Baptist making them two levels more Republican.  Still, 
however, the results are modest, with the strongest predicted value barely crossing into the weakest level 
of Republican identity (5) on the seven point Party ID scale. 
 Gay Marriage and Pro-Life.  The analysis now turns to the second subgroup of dependent 
variables, those for which Evangelicals are typically associated with a particular position.  Results of the 
interaction effects for Gay Marriage and Pro-Life are presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. 
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(p > 0.391) 
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.374/.242 
(p > 0.391) 
 
 Perhaps surprisingly, the interaction effects make a rather weak showing with regard to support 
for Gay Marriage.  These effects reach statistical significance only 27.7% of the time (10/36) and change 
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the predicted outcome only 8.3% of the time (3/36).  Southern Baptist reduces predicted support for Gay 
Marriage from above to below .500 for Whites, as does Nondenominational Evangelical for Non-Church 
Regulars.  On the other hand, Church of Christ increases predicted support from below to above .500 for 
Church Regulars.  Overall, while most of the statistically significant effects fail to change the predicted 
outcome, it is worth noting that – except for Church of Christ – the effects are consistently negative.   
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- .110 
.489/.379 
(p > 0.206) 
- .020 
.442/.422 
(p > 0.206) 
- .017 
.417/.400 
(p > 0.046) 
- .123 
.562/.439 




(p > 0.710) 
.082 
.441/.523 
(p > 0.710) 
.083 
.416/.499 
(p > 0.573) 
.059 
.560/.619 




(p > 0.190) 
.098 
.440/.538 
(p > 0.190) 
.124 
.415/.539 
(p > 0.000) 
- .017 
.562/.545 
(p > 0.000) 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God 
.085 
.489/.574 
(p > 0.998) 
.099 
.442/.541 
(p > 0.998) 
.166 
.417/.583 
(p > 0.000) 
- .105 
.563/.458 




(p > 0.209) 
.097 
.439/.536 
(p > 0.209) 
.122 
.413/.535 
(p > 0.000) 
- .003 
.561/.558 




(p > 0.825) 
.123 
.441/.564 
(p > 0.825) 
.151 
.416/.567 
(p > 0.004) 
.030 
.561/.591 




(p > 0.808) 
.045 
.441/.486 
(p > 0.808) 
.082 
.416/.498 
(p > 0.000) 
- .058 
.562/.504 
(p > 0.000) 
 
 The interaction effects look stronger for Pro-Life than for Gay Marriage, but they are still not 
particularly strong.  These effects achieve statistical significance 50.0% of the time (18/36), but the 
contrast is rather stark.  Only one measure (Evangelical / Black respondents removed) is significant for 
the interaction with White, while all the measures except one (Lutheran Missouri) are significant for the 
interaction with Church Regular.  However, the predicted outcome changes only 22.2% of the time 
41 
(8/36).  Perhaps surprisingly, the changes in predicted outcome are split evenly between positive and 
negative effects.  Evangelical  / Black respondents removed lowers the predicted probability of support 
from above to below .500 for Non-Whites.  Evangelical, Church of Christ, and Pentecostal Assemblies of 
God do likewise for Church Regulars.  Meanwhile, Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal 
Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, and American Baptist all increase predicted support from below to 
above the .500 level for Non-Church Regulars.  Interestingly, this means that Pentecostal Assemblies of 
God affects Church Regulars and Non-Church Regulars in opposite directions (Figure 2.9). 
 
Figure 2.9 Interaction of Pentecostal Assemblies of God over Church Regular - Pro-Life 
 
 Overall, then, the interaction effects of evangelical identity on Gay Marriage and Pro-Life are 
quite weak.  At best, statistical significance is reached only about half the time, while the predicted 
outcome is changed no more than about one in five times.  Further, even when the predicted outcome is 
changed, the changes are equally split between positive and negative effects. 
 Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, and Racism.  Thus, the analysis now reaches the interaction effects 
for the final subgroup of dependent variables.  As described earlier, these are variables for which 
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(p > 0.000) 
.002 
.638/.640 
(p > 0.000) 
.007 
.682/.689 
(p > 0.156) 
.021 
.610/.631 




(p > 0.781) 
.008 
.637/.645 
(p > 0.781) 
.005 
.668/.673 
(p > 0.375) 
.015 
.569/.584 
(p > 0.375) 
Church of Christ 
.001 
.737/.738 
(p > 0.703) 
.025 
.639/.664 
(p > 0.703) 
.004 
.683/.687 
(p > 0.261) 
.057 
.620/.677 




(p > 0.368) 
- .033 
.640/.607 
(p > 0.368) 
- .045 
.683/.638 
(p > 0.726) 
- .038 
.621/.583 




(p > 0.009) 
- .108 
.642/.534 
(p > 0.009) 
- .110 
.685/.575 
(p > 0.000) 
- .029 
.623/.594 
(p > 0.000) 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God 
- .007 
.737/.730 
(p > 0.477) 
- .039 
.640/.601 
(p > 0.477) 
- .027 
.683/.656 
(p > 0.713) 
- .040 
.621/.581 




(p > 0.003) 
- .059 
.642/.583 
(p > 0.003) 
- .044 
.684/.640 
(p > 0.508) 
- .032 
.623/.591 




(p > 0.278) 
.027 
.639/.666 
(p > 0.278) 
.014 
.683/.697 
(p > 0.793) 
.024 
.620/.644 




(p > 0.137) 
- .070 
.640/.570 
(p > 0.137) 
- .052 
.684/.632 
(p > 0.449) 
- .073 
.621/.548 
(p > 0.449) 
 
 Results for the interaction effects on Assault Rifle Ban are shown in Table 2.8.  Briefly put, there 
is little to see here.  Statistical significance is reached only 22.2% of the time (8/36).  None of the effects 
change the predicted outcome, which may be due in part to the support levels being so high overall.  To 
the extent that there are any worthwhile results, it may be that Evangelical has positive effects while the 
RELTRAD measures have negative effects.  In other words, Evangelical tends to produce more liberal 
positions, while RELTRAD tends to produce more conservative positions. 
 Table 2.9 presents the interaction results for Dreamer.  There is more here than for Assault Rifle 
Ban, although that does not necessarily mean much.  Statistical significance is achieved 33.3% of the time 
(12/36), and the predicted outcome changes 13.8% of the time (5/36).  The direction of the predicted 
outcome changes is split rather evenly.  Church of Christ, Lutheran Missouri, and American Baptist all 
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reduce the predicted probability of supporting Dreamer from above to below the .500 level for Non-
Whites.  Church of Christ increases the predicted probability of supporting Dreamer from below to above 
.500 for Whites, while Evangelical does the same for Non-Church Regulars.  Thus, Church of Christ 
produces negative effects for Non-Whites but positive effects for Whites.  Also, as with Assault Rifle 
Ban, the general pattern – while limited in scope – is that Evangelical tends to produce more politically 
liberal positions, and the RELTRAD measures tend to produce more politically conservative positions. 
 











(p > 0.822) 
.047 
.446/.493 
(p > 0.822) 
.041 
.489/.530 
(p > 0.016) 
.063 
.394/.457 




(p > 0.212) 
.045 
.447/.492 
(p > 0.212) 
.044 
.483/.527 
(p > 0.080) 
.061 
.376/.437 
(p > 0.080) 
Church of Christ 
- .083 
.523/.440 
(p > 0.016) 
.064 
.455/.519 
(p > 0.016) 
.003 
.493/.496 
(p > 0.081) 
.077 
.421/.498 




(p > 0.026) 
- .023 
.456/.433 
(p > 0.026) 
- .075 
.494/.419 
(p > 0.107) 
- .022 
.421/.399 




(p > 0.050) 
- .051 
.456/.405 
(p > 0.050) 
- .059 
.494/.435 
(p > 0.000) 
.024 
.420/.444 
(p > 0.000) 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God 
.034 
.522/.556 
(p > 0.405) 
- .013 
.456/.443 
(p > 0.405) 
- .019 
.493/.474 
(p > 0.082) 
.056 
.420/.476 




(p > 0.102) 
- .055 
.458/.403 
(p > 0.102) 
- .066 
.495/.429 
(p > 0.997) 
- .065 
.426/.361 




(p > 0.016) 
- .011 
.456/.445 
(p > 0.016) 
- .041 
.494/.453 
(p > 0.701) 
- .030 
.422/.392 




(p > 0.685) 
- .079 
.457/.378 
(p > 0.685) 
- .079 
.495/.416 
(p > 0.372) 
- .100 
.424/.324 
(p > 0.372) 
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 Finally, interaction effects for Racism are shown in Table 2.10.  Recall that higher values 
represent stronger agreement with the statement that racial problems in the United States are rare, isolated 
situations.  As with the other dependent variables in this subgroup, there is little to report.  Statistical 
significance is achieved only 33.3% of the time (12/36), and predicted outcomes are changed only 2.7% 
of the time (1/36).  The only predicted value change is for Evangelical, which reduces the predicted value 
for Non-Church Regulars by one level on the five point Racism scale.  The direction of the effects is a 
rather mixed bag overall, although it bears noting that the effects are consistently negative for Church 
Regulars. 











(p > 0.399) 
.024 
2.420/2.138 
(p > 0.399) 
-.178 
2.225/1.981 
(p > 0.000) 
-.178 
2.722/2.299 




(p > 0.007) 
-.108 
2.427/2.109 
(p > 0.007) 
-.179 
2.265/2.009 
(p > 0.000) 
-.179 
2.831/2.395 
(p > 0.000) 
Church of Christ 
-.119 
2.057/2.100 
(p > 0.486) 
-.119 
2.353/2.296 
(p > 0.486) 
-.355 
2.197/2.254 
(p > 0.003) 
-.355 
2.526/2.234 




(p > 0.066) 
-.267 
2.349/2.508 
(p > 0.066) 
-.050 
2.195/2.426 
(p > 0.587) 
-.050 
2.520/2.716 




(p > 0.074) 
.114 
2.350/2.518 
(p > 0.074) 
-.235 
2.194/2.395 
(p > 0.000) 
-.235 
2.526/2.486 
(p > 0.000) 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God 
.044 
2.058/1.980 
(p > 0.733) 
.044 
2.353/2.329 
(p > 0.733) 
-.154 
2.197/2.201 
(p > 0.143) 
-.154 
2.526/2.373 




(p > 0.201) 
.073 
2.349/2.457 
(p > 0.201) 
-.202 
2.193/2.333 
(p > 0.000) 
-.202 
2.528/2.462 




(p > 0.658) 
-.048 
2.351/2.569 
(p > 0.658) 
.003 
2.196/2.424 
(p > 0.979) 
.003 
2.520/2.753 




(p > 0.086) 
.134 
2.351/2.451 
(p > 0.086) 
-.105 
2.196/2.292 
(p > 0.212) 
-.105 
2.524/2.507 
(p > 0.212) 
 
 All things considered, the interaction effects of evangelical identity on this last subgroup of 
dependent variables is – bluntly put – weak.  Statistical significance is never higher than 33.3%, while 
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predicted outcomes are never changed more than 13.8% of the time.  The direction of the effects is a 
rather mixed bag, although there is something of a tendency – perhaps less so for Racism – for 
Evangelical to produce more liberal positions, while the RELTRAD measures produce more conservative 
positions. 
2.3 Control Variables 
 Now that the impact of the direct effects and interaction effects of evangelical identity on the 
dependent variables has been explored, it is appropriate to consider the impact of the control variables; 
these are demographic indicators such as age, education, etc.  Recall that the essential contention here is 
that evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of political behavior and that it is likely 
outweighed by other relevant variables.  Thus, it is necessary to consider the effects of the control 
variables in order to compare their relative impact with that of the evangelical measures.  The dependent 
variables are presented in the same three subgroups explained previously. 
 Trump Vote and Party ID.  Results for the effects of the controls on Trump Vote are presented in 
Table 2.11.  Notably, all six of them achieve very high levels of statistical significance (p > 0.000), and 
this remains constant across all three approaches to measuring evangelical identity.  Thus, statistical 
significance is achieved 100.0% of the time (18/18).   
 The predicted outcomes are changed 38.8% of the time (7/18).  Both Age and Party ID increase 
the predicted probability of voting for Trump from below to above the .500 level in all three models.  
Education reduces the predicted probability of voting for Trump from above to below the .500 level in the 
Evangelical / Black respondents removed model and may well have done so in the other models but for 
the fact that the beginning point is just below .500 (.488, .494).  While they do not change any predicted 
outcomes, Male, White, and Church Regular have consistently positive effects. 
 Not surprisingly, Party ID has the largest impact, increasing the predicted probability of voting 
for Trump from about five percent to more than ninety percent moving from Strong Democrat to Strong 
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Republican on the Party ID scale.  Results for the Evangelical model are presented in Figure 2.10; the 
results are substantially similar across all three models. 









(p > 0.000) 
.202 
.371/.573 
(p > 0.000) 
.184 
.344/.528 




(p > 0.000) 
-.136 
.530/.394 
(p > 0.000) 
-.135 
.494/.359 




(p > 0.000) 
.879 
.051/.930 
(p > 0.000) 
.884 
.045/.929 




(p > 0.000) 
.028 
.438/.466 
(p > 0.000) 
.027 
.403/.430 




(p > 0.000) 
.023 
.433/.456 
(p > 0.000) 
.051 
.376/.427 




(p > 0.000) 
.027 
.448/.475 
(p > 0.000) 
.041 
.408/.449 
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 Age also appears to have a significant impact, as the probability of voting for Trump increases 
from below to above the .500 threshold as age increases.  Figure 2.11 presents the results of the 
Evangelical model.  The results are substantially the same for the other models, except that the .500 
threshold is crossed at an earlier age point in the model with Black respondents removed. 
 
Figure 2.11 Effect of Age on Trump Vote / Evangelical 
 
 While it changes the predicted outcome only in the Evangelical model with Black respondents 
removed (Figure 2.12), essentially because the predicted probability of voting for Trump is just below 
.500 for the lowest education level in the other models, education also has a significant impact.  Unlike 
age, however, the impact of education is consistently negative.  Respondents are somewhat less likely to 
vote for Trump as education level increases, as the predicted probability of doing so drops by about 
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Figure 2.12 Effect of Education on Trump Vote / Evangelical / Black respondents removed 
 
 Moving now to the impact of the control variables on Party ID, these results are presented in 
Table 2.12.  Again, statistical significance is achieved at a very high p > 0.000 100.0% of the time 
(15/15).   









(p > 0.000) 
.006 
3.589/4.113 
(p > 0.000) 
.004 
3.429/3.795 




(p > 0.000) 
-.118 
4.096/3.505 
(p > 0.000) 
-.116 
3.871/3.288 




(p > 0.000) 
.241 
3.662/3.903 
(p > 0.000) 
.273 
3.432/3.705 




(p > 0.000) 
.418 
3.398/3.858 
(p > 0.000) 
1.027 
2.739/3.888 




(p > 0.000) 
.503 
3.657/4.152 
(p > 0.000) 
.648 
3.399/4.021 
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 The predicted outcomes change a bit more frequently here than for Trump Vote, coming in at 
40.0% (6/15).  Except for Education, the effects are all positive. 
               However, as suggested by the predicted values, the effects of these variables – while consistent – 
are modest.  In the Evangelical model, White is the only variable that actually changes the predicted 
outcome (Whites are one level more Republican on the Party ID scale than Non-Whites).  Meanwhile, 
dropping Black respondents from the model produces three control variables that change the predicted 
outcome.  One of these is Church Regular, which indicates that respondents who attend church at least 
weekly are one level more Republican on the Party ID scale than respondents who do not.  Getting older 
also makes respondents more Republican, but the effect is so modest that the next level on the Party ID 
scale is not reached until after age eighty (Figure 2.13).  Similarly, as mentioned above, increasing levels 
of education make respondents less Republican; however, the Party ID level shifts simply by graduating 
from high school (Figure 2.14).  Finally, in the RELTRAD model both White and Church Regular make 
respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale.   
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Figure 2.14 Effect of Education on Party ID / Evangelical / Black respondents removed 
  
 Overall, then, the effects of the control variables on the two most overtly political dependent 
variables are fairly strong.  This is particularly true for statistical significance, which reaches p > 0.000 
for all of the controls across all three models.  Further, the predicted outcome changes roughly four out of 
ten times.  The direction of the effects is quite consistent, with Education having negative effects and all 
of the other measures having positive effects. 
 Gay Marriage and Pro-Life.  Having addressed the overtly political dependent variables, the 
discussion moves now to the second subgroup of dependent variables, those with certain positions 
traditionally associated with evangelicals.   
 Of course, opposition to gay marriage is a position strongly associated with evangelicals.  Results 
for the effects of the control variables are presented in Table 2.13.  As before, all of them are very highly 
significant (p > 0.000), and this remains true across all three models.  Thus, statistical significance is 
achieved 100.0% of the time.  The predicted outcomes change 38.8% of the time (7/18), and all of these 
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 Both Age and Party ID reduce the predicted probability of supporting Gay Marriage from above 
to below the .500 level in all three models.  Church Regular does so in the RELTRAD model and barely 
misses the mark in the other models, reducing the predicted probability of support by roughly twenty 
percent to .501 and .504, respectively. 









(p > 0.000) 
-.261 
.747/.486 
(p > 0.000) 
-.271 
.739/.468 




(p > 0.000) 
.113 
.598/.711 
(p > 0.000) 
.148 
.569/.717 




(p > 0.000) 
-.410 
.839/.429 
(p > 0.000) 
-.415 
.816/.401 




(p > 0.000) 
-.066 
.692/.626 
(p > 0.000) 
-.048 
.673/.625 




(p > 0.000) 
.057 
.612/.669 
(p > 0.000) 
.108 
.571/.679 




(p > 0.000) 
-.209 
.713/.504 
(p > 0.000) 
-.297 
.727/.430 
(p > 0.000) 
 
 Among these variables, Party ID has the single largest impact.  Moving from Strong Democrat to 
Strong Republican lowers the predicted probability of supporting gay marriage from just over eighty 
percent to just over forty percent, but support does not drop below fifty percent until reaching Fairly 
Strong Republican (Figure 2.15).   
 Increasing age and regular church attendance reduce support by significant levels, although the 
impact of Age is more consistent across the models; the predicted probability of support falls below fifty 
percent in all three models for Age but only does so in the RELTRAD model for Church Regular.  
However, as reflected in Figure 2.16, the predicted probability does not fall below fifty percent until a 
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 Turning now to Pro-Life, recall that the measure used asks whether respondents support a policy 
prohibiting abortion except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life.  The effects of the 
control variables are presented in Table 2.14. 










(p > 0.379) 
.004 
.449/.453 
(p > 0.681) 
.006 
.453/.459 




(p > 0.000) 
-.161 
.538/.377 
(p > 0.000) 
-.185 
.555/.370 




(p > 0.000) 
.265 
.329/.594 
(p > 0.000) 
.259 
.345/.604 




(p > 0.000) 
.081 
.412/.493 
(p > 0.000) 
.075 
.420/.495 
(p > 0.000) 
White 
-  .091 
.520/.429 
(p > 0.000) 
- .087 
.522/.435 
(p > 0.000) 
- .097 
.525/.428 




(p > 0.000) 
.086 
.442/.528 
(p > 0.000) 
.114 
.429/.543 
(p > 0.000) 
 
 The most immediate takeaway from these results is that – unlike the control variables for the 
previous dependent variables – not all of them achieve statistical significance.  However, all except Age 
reach p > 0.000 across all three models, meaning that statistical significance is achieved  83.3% of the 
time (15/18).  Further, the predicted outcomes change 66.6% of the time (12/18).  Both Education and 
White reduce the predicted probability of supporting the Pro-Life position from above to below the .500 
level across all three models.  Both Party ID and Church Regular do likewise but in a positive direction.  
Male does not change any predicted outcomes but does come close in all three models. 
 Party ID again has an important impact, with the predicted probability of supporting the Pro-Life 
position shifting from below to above fifty percent once respondents move from Independent to Lean 
Republican on the Party ID scale.  While negative, Education also has a consistent effect, with support 
falling below fifty percent once respondents move beyond high school graduate on the Education scale.  
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Since these results are substantially the same across all three versions of the model, only results from the 
RELTRAD model are presented in Figures 2.17 – 2.18. 
 
Figure 2.17 Effect of Party ID on Pro-Life Support / RELTRAD 
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 Overall, the performance of the control variables continues to be quite strong for this subgroup of 
dependent variables.  As a group, they fail to reach statistical significance 100.0% of the time only 
because Age fails to do so for Pro-Life.  Further, the rate at which the predicted outcomes change is fairly 
good for Gay Marriage (38.8%, 7/18) but quite strong for Pro-Life (66.6%, 12/18). 
 Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, and Racism.  The final subgroup of dependent variables consists of 
those that might be expected to break along ideological – although not necessarily religious - dimensions.  
Results for Assault Rifle Ban are presented in Table 2.15. 
 Statistical significance continues to be strong at 72.2% (13/18).  However, Party ID, which lowers 
the predicted probability of supporting the ban from above to below the .500 level, is the only control that 
changes the predicted outcome.  Thus, that figure comes in somewhat lower than the controls for the other 
subgroups at 16.6% (3/18).  This appears to be because the overall level of support begins at such a high 
point that even the significant negative effects of Male – the only other control with consistently negative 
effects – are not enough to change the predicted outcome. 









(p > 0.000) 
.239 
.552/.791 
(p > 0.000) 
.244 
.570/.814 




(p > 0.000) 
.081 
.602/.683 
(p > 0.000) 
.095 
.615/.710 




(p > 0.000) 
-.508 
.864/.356 
(p > 0.000) 
-.504 
.865/.361 




(p > 0.000) 
- .179 
.733/.554 
(p > 0.000) 
- .168 
.746/.578 




(p > 0.113) 
.000 
.646/.646 
(p > 0.917) 
- .013 
.676/.663 




(p > 0.484) 
.008 
.643/.651 
(p > 0.349) 
- .009 
.668/.659 
(p > 0.004) 
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 Again, Party ID has the biggest impact and is the only control that produces a shift in predicted 
probabilities crossing the .500 threshold in either direction.  Notably, the predicted probability of support 
for an assault rifle ban remains above .500 even for those who identify as Lean Republican; it only drops 
below .500 for the two most Republican levels on the Party ID scale.  Since these results are substantially 
the same across all versions of the model, only the RELTRAD results are presented in Figure 2.19. 
 
Figure 2.19 Effect of Party ID on Support for Assault Rifle Ban / RELTRAD 
 
 Moving on to Dreamer, results for the effects of the controls are presented in Table 2.16.  At 
88.8% (16/18) overall, the controls continue to perform at a very high level of statistical significance.  
The predicted outcome changes 33.3% of the time (6/18), with all of those instances resulting from 
Education and Party ID. 
 As is not atypical, Party ID has the single largest impact.  Support for the policy is highest among 
Strong Democrats, then declines steadily until reaching Strong Republican.  Notably, the predicted 
probability of support is above .500 only for those who at least Lean Democrat.  Since these results are 
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(p > 0.000) 
-.056 
.485/.429 
(p > 0.000) 
-.051 
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(p > 0.000) 
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.175 
.381/.556 




(p > 0.000) 
-.442 
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-.424 
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- .017 
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- .010 
.479/.469 




(p > 0.000) 
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.459/.467 
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 With the exception that the effects are positive instead of negative, the results are quite similar for 
Education.  Support is lowest among respondents who did not graduate from high school, then increases 
steadily as education level increases.  Notably, the predicted probability of support does not cross the .500 
threshold until respondents hold a four-year college degree.  Since these results are substantially the same 
across all three models, only results from the RELTRAD model are presented in Figure 2.21. 
 
Figure 2.21 Effect of Education on Dreamer / RELTRAD 
 
 None of the remaining control variables cause the predicted probability of support to shift from 
below to above fifty percent or vice versa.  This is particularly interesting for Church Regular, which has 
a modest negative effect.  Church folks – at least arguably – might have been expected to be a little more 
receptive than less so. 
 Finally, the analysis of the impact of the controls turns to Racism.  Recall that this measure asks 
respondents to rate their agreement on a five point scale with the statement that racial problems in the 
United States are rare, isolated situations.  These results are presented in Table 2.17.   
 Performance with regard to statistical significance continues to be very strong at 94.4% (17/18) 
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reach p > 0.000.  This is not surprising, as the contrast with Black respondents is lost by removing them 
from the model. 
 The predicted outcomes change 16.6% of the time (3/18).  All of the changes are accounted for 
by Party ID, which comes fairly close to making respondents two levels higher on the Racism scale. 









(p > 0.000) 
-.003 
2.432/2.185 
(p > 0.000) 
-.004 
2.399/2.096 




(p > 0.000) 
-.020 
2.390/2.291 
(p > 0.000) 
-.030 
2.364/2.214 




(p > 0.000) 
.187 
1.811/2.934 
(p > 0.000) 
.191 
1.779/2.927 




(p > 0.000) 
.274 
2.212/2.486 
(p > 0.000) 
.262 
2.166/2.428 




(p > 0.000) 
.020 
2.337/2.336 
(p > 0.212) 
.088 
2.212/2.305 




(p > 0.000) 
.193 
2.308/2.467 
(p > 0.000) 
.215 
2.238/2.429 
(p > 0.000) 
 
 Again, Party ID is the only control that actually produces a different value on the Racism scale.  
Even then moving beyond Lean Democrat only drops the predicted value from 2 to 1, the value 
expressing the strongest level of disagreement with the Racism statement.  In other words, only 
respondents with the two strongest levels of Democratic identity have a different value from everyone 
else on the Racism scale.  These results are substantially the same across the models, so only results from 
the RELTRAD model are presented in Figure 2.22.  
 While it does not change any of the predicted outcomes, it is interesting to note that Church 
Regular has a modest positive effect.  This indicates that those who attend church at least weekly express 
a slightly higher level of agreement with the Racism statement than those who do not. 
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Figure 2.22 Effect of Party ID on Racism / RELTRAD 
 
 Overall, then, the performance of the controls for this last subgroup of dependent variables is 
quite strong.  This is particularly true for statistical significance, which never drops below 72.2%.  The 
range of predicted outcome changes is either 16.6% or 33.3% for all three dependent variables.  However, 
Party ID is the only control that changes predicted outcomes for all of them. 
2.4 Summary 
 
 Now that the results for primary effects, interaction effects, and the control variables have been 
presented, this section of the analysis proceeds to a comparison of their relative impact.  In summarizing 
these results, it is useful to begin by reviewing the primary effects of evangelical identity on the 
dependent variables.  These are presented in Table 2.18.  Cells for Trump Vote, Gay Marriage, Pro-Life, 
Dreamer, and Gun Control show marginal effects, predicted probabilities, and p values.  Cells for Party 
ID and Racism show regression coefficients, predicted values, and p values.  Shaded cells represent  
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(p > 0.000) 
-.576 
3.481/3.917 
(p > 0.000) 
- .016 
.654/.638 
(p > 0.004) 
- .045 
.475/.430 
(p > 0.934) 
.047 
.464/.511 
(p > 0.003) 
.011 
.663/.674 
(p > 0.006) 
-.262 
2.353/2.063 





(p > 0.003) 
.285 
3.694/4.153 
(p > 0.000) 
- .017 
.663/.646 
(p > 0.120) 
- .053 
.471/.418 
(p > 0.002) 
.049 
.456/.505 
(p > 0.001) 
.007 
.644/.651 
(p > 0.916) 
-.166 
2.405/2.104 
(p > 0.001) 
Church of Christ 
-.027 
.417/.390 
(p > 0.690) 
.087 
3.560/3.360 
(p > 0.735) 
.058 
.650/.708 
(p > 0.692) 
- .045 
.455/.410 
(p > 0.220) 
.023 
.474/.497 
(p > 0.081) 
.018 
.666/.684 
(p > 0.824) 
.149 
2.282/2.249 




(p > 0.085) 
1.179 
3.547/4.435 
(p > 0.000) 
- .051 
.651/.600 
(p > 0.318) 
.076 
.454/.530 
(p > 0.247) 
- .061 
.475/.414 
(p > 0.004) 
- .043 
.667/.624 
(p > 0.105) 
.438 
2.279/2.501 





(p > 0.000) 
.739 
3.525/4.616 
(p > 0.000) 
- .249 
.657/.408 
(p > 0.000) 
.087 
.454/.541 
(p > 0.000) 
- .038 
.475/.437 
(p > 0.324) 
- .089 
.669/.580 
(p > 0.004) 
.112 
2.280/2.418 
(p > 0.092) 
Pentecostal 
Assemblies of  God 
.099 
.416/.515 
(p > 0.547) 
1.135 
3.548/4.559 
(p > 0.000) 
- .239 
.652/.413 
(p > 0.000) 
.095 
.455/.550 
(p > 0.002) 
.001 
.474/.475 
(p > 0.836) 
- .030 
.667/.637 
(p > 0.928) 
-.031 
2.282/2.245 




(p > 0.149) 
-.345 
3.526/4.259 
(p > 0.000) 
- .157 
.657/.500 
(p > 0.000) 
.089 
.452/.541 
(p > 0.000) 
- .066 
.477/.411 
(p > 0.000) 
- .041 
.668/.627 
(p > 0.986) 
.084 
2.279/2.367 




(p > 0.330) 
-.594 
3.560/3.685 
(p > 0.000) 
- .100 
.651/.551 
(p > 0.000) 
.119 
.454/.573 
(p > 0.000) 
- .038 
.475/.437 
(p > 0.001) 
.017 
.666/.683 
(p > 0.610) 
.265 
2.279/2.509 




(p > 0.518) 
-.709 
3.556/3.951 
(p > 0.000) 
- .118 
.653/.535 
(p > 0.000) 
.045 
.454/.499 
(p > 0.000) 
- .084 
.476/.392 
(p > 0.000) 
- .057 
.667/.610 
(p > 0.351) 
-.008 
2.281/2.347 
(p > 0.906) 
 
 Since there are nine measures of evangelical identity and seven dependent variables, the table 
contains sixty-three cells.  Only thirty-five of them are shaded, which means that evangelical identity is 
statistically significant barely over half the time (55.5%). 
 More telling, however, is the extent to which evangelical identity “moves the needle.”  In other 
words, to what extent does evangelical identity change the predicted outcome?  This is determined by 
looking at whether evangelical identity changes the predicted value on the Party ID and Racism scales 
and whether it produces a change in predicted probabilities that crosses the .500 threshold in either 
direction for the remaining dependent variables, which are binary.  Based on this metric, evangelical 
identity “moves the needle” in only thirteen of the sixty-three squares, barely one in five (20.6%). 
 In addition, this limited impact occurs in somewhat concentrated ways.  Party ID accounts for 
five of the thirteen changes in predicted outcomes.  Evangelical  / Black respondents removed, Lutheran 
Missouri, Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, and Southern Baptist all make 
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respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale.  The three other statistically significant 
measures of evangelical identity (Evangelical, American Baptist, and Other Baptist) make respondents 
more Republican, just not by enough to change the predicted value. 
 Pro-Life accounts for four more of the changes in predicted outcomes.  Nondenominational 
Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, and American Baptist all increase the 
predicted probability of supporting the pro-life position from below to above .500.  The other two 
statistically significant measures of evangelical are split; Other Baptist just misses moving the needle 
(predicted probability .499), while Evangelical / Black respondents removed actually decreases support 
for the pro-life position. 
 Gay Marriage and Dreamer split the final four changes in predicted outcomes.  
Nondenominational Evangelical and Pentecostal Assemblies of God both drop predicted support for gay 
marriage from above to below .500, while Southern Baptist barely misses (predicted probability .500).  
Evangelical, American Baptist, and Other Baptist all reduce support, just not by enough to move the 
needle (all three still favor it).  As for Dreamer, both measures of Evangelical (with and without Blacks 
included) increase the predicted probability of support from below to above .500.  Notably, the remaining 
statistically significant measures (Lutheran Missouri, Southern Baptist, American Baptist, and Other 
Baptist) all reduce the predicted probability of support, with all values below the .500 level. 
 This leads to a rather interesting observation.  For the three variables that are intended to explore 
whether evangelicals might break in a more politically conservative direction than other respondents 
(Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, and Racism), a very clear pattern emerges.  It is spotty, of course, since less 
than half of those cells reach statistical significance, and most of the effects are rather modest.  Still, the 
broader Evangelical measure consistently breaks in a more liberal direction, while the specific traditions 
consistently break in a more conservative direction.  This pattern holds across all three issues. 
 To be sure, evangelical identity can also exert influence through interaction effects.  For example, 
recall that Nondenominational Evangelical and Southern Baptist both make Whites two levels more 
Republican on the Party ID scale.  Still, however, the overall impact of evangelical identity is not exactly 
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dominant.  The interaction effects achieve statistical significance only 38.8% of the time overall (98/252), 
and they produce outcome changes only 13.1% of the time (33/252).  Both of these are even lower than 
the results reported for the direct effects of evangelical identity. 
 In the bigger picture, the control variables appear to have more consistent impact than evangelical 
identity.  It is not feasible to construct a table for the controls, as it would contain 123 cells!  Nonetheless, 
the control variables achieve statistical significance in 111 out of 123 opportunities, which is much higher 
than for the direct effects (90.2% compared to 55.5%).  Further, the controls change the predicted 
outcome in 44 of those 123, which is approaching double the rate for the direct effects (35.8% compared 
to 20.6%).  Party ID is the predominant factor by far, moving the needle in all eighteen opportunities.  
Education does so in eight of twenty-one opportunities, mostly by consistently increasing support for 
Dreamer and reducing support for Pro-Life.  Age does so seven times, mostly by increasing support for 
Trump and decreasing support for Gay Marriage.  Church Regular changes the outcome six times, with 
half of those coming through increasing support for Pro-Life.  White performs similarly, with three of its 
five outcome changes coming through decreasing support for Pro-Life.  Finally, despite being statistically 
significant in all twenty-one opportunities, Male fails to change any predicted outcomes at all. 
 Perhaps more telling, however, is that all seven hypotheses are supported by these results.  
Literally every dependent variable has at least one other factor that, on the whole, appears to have larger 
overall impact than evangelical identity.  These include Age, Education, and Party ID for Trump Vote; 
White for Party ID; Age, Party ID, and Church Regular (RELTRAD) for Gay Marriage; Education and 
Party ID for Pro-Life; Age, Education (RELTRAD), Party ID, and Male for Assault Rifle Ban; Education 
and Party ID for Dreamer; and Age and Party ID for Racism.  Importantly, this is the case even though 
the evangelical measure with the strongest effect for each dependent variable is used as the benchmark for 
that dependent variable.  Given these results, it is difficult to argue that evangelical identity is the 
predominant determinant of political behavior. 
 Finally, before concluding the discussion here, it is worthwhile to revisit the issue perhaps most 
closely associated with evangelical political behavior: support for Donald Trump.  Table 2.19 presents the 
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results of the Trump Vote models seen previously alongside Trump’s actual performance for each group 
in 2016. 
 Based on these results, two things seem apparent.  First, several of these groups did indeed 
strongly support Donald Trump with their votes in 2016, as Trump received upwards of sixty percent of 
the votes from six of these nine groups.  Second, their evangelical identity does not appear to be the 
reason why this happened.  Only three of the nine measures reached statistical significance in the models, 
and two of those project a modest decrease in Trump support.  The third, Nondenominational Evangelical, 
fails to move the predicted probability of voting for Trump above the .500 level.  This offers even further 
evidence that evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of political behavior. 
 Overall, then, the results based on the individual level variables are very supportive.  The next 
step is to add county level variables to the mix, and this occurs in Chapter Three. 
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3 EFFECTS OF COUNTY LEVEL VARIABLES 
 
 As Chapter Two establishes, evangelical identity does not appear to be the predominant factor in 
determining the political behavior of evangelicals.  Indeed, the control variables have a more consistent 
impact on behavior than evangelical identity does, in that they are statistically significant and produce 
different outcomes much more frequently than do the measures of evangelical identity.  Further, all seven 
hypotheses are supported by the Chapter Two results, as at least one other relevant variable has an overall 
larger effect on the outcome for each of the dependent variables than even the strongest of the evangelical 
identity measures. 
 Still, however, it is important to note that those results are produced by models including only 
individual level variables.  That is, those models do not include any Level 2 variables to account for any 
influence of the environment in which respondents find themselves.  Thus, the models for this chapter 
expand upon the previous results by adding county level variables to the mix.  Before launching into that 
analysis, though, it is useful to briefly explore the results produced by using a very basic measure of the 
political environment of each county. 
 While admittedly somewhat crude, Figures 3.1 – 3.7 present the results of a series of models 
using the same dependent variables examined in Chapter Two but with only one independent variable: the 
percent of the 2016 vote received by Donald Trump in the county of residence for each respondent (RRH 
Elections, 2018, for Alaska; Politico, 2016, for all other states).  The figures present predicted values for 
Party ID and Racism and predicted probabilities for the remaining dependent variables, which are binary.  
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Figure 3.7 Racism by County Percent Trump 
 
 
 These results show more than simply Republicans voting for a Republican.  Indeed, the graphs 
speak for themselves with regard to the nature of the relationships.  County Percent Trump reaches p > 
0.000 and “moves the needle” in all of the models, in that the predicted outcome changes.  Admittedly, 
the predicted outcome change does not occur until the outer limits of the independent variable in a couple 
of the models, such as support for Gay Marriage and Assault Rifle Ban.  In addition, it is border-line for 
Racism.  Using the same margins for County Percent Trump as the other models (minimum 5%) results in 
a projected Racism value of 2.003, whereas using the actual minimum (4.1%) results in a projected value 
of 1.997.  Not surprisingly, the effects for Party ID are huge, barely missing a shift of three levels on the 
Party ID scale (2.378 – 4.993).  Still, the key takeaway is that the projected outcome does change within 
the range of actual values of County Percent Trump for all seven models.  These results certainly appear 
to support the contention that political environment impacts political behavior more so than evangelical 
identity does.  Thus, the analysis now turns to exploring this impact in a more precise manner. 
 Like the preceding results, the models that follow use the same seven dependent variables used in 
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possible because the common content section of the CCES includes the county of residence for each 
respondent.  Therefore, it is possible to expand the data set by using 2016 (the year of the CCES survey 
used) American Community Survey data maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau.  This is done in such a 
way as to track the primary independent variables from Chapter Two at the county level.  For example, 
the respondent’s age is matched by the percent of the population of respondent’s county that is age 62 or 
above.  The binary variable for whether respondent is White is matched with the percent of the population 
of respondent’s county that is White.  The respondent’s education level is matched by the percent of the 
county’s population that holds at least a high school diploma.  Gender is not included at the county level 
because there would be little variance, while Party ID and Church Regular are not included because the 
Census data does not report this information.   
 Meanwhile, a couple of new county level independent variables are added here that did not 
appear in Chapter Two.  For example, since it is not unreasonable to expect that the contextual factors 
may have a more pronounced impact on individual behavior in smaller counties, county population is 
added as an independent variable.  Also, since it is well established that people who live in different parts 
of the country do not look at politics in the same ways, it is appropriate that a control variable of some 
sort be added to the models to address this.  In this case, the single largest group by religious tradition is 
Southern Baptist, and they do tend to display at least some of the behaviors that are of interest here.  
While there are some Southern Baptist respondents in virtually every state, they are concentrated in the 
South.  Fully seventy-five percent of them live in the fourteen states from Texas to Virginia plus Missouri 
and Oklahoma.  Thus, a binary variable for Southern Baptist states is coded 1 if the respondent lives in 
one of those states.  This is not completely unlike the old dummy variable for South that routinely 
appeared in research of ages past, but it has been designed in a way that attempts to address evangelical 
identity within the larger environmental context.   
 Because all respondents who live in a particular county have the same values for the county level 
indicators, the models are run with standard errors clustered by county.  In order to facilitate comparisons, 
tables include individual level results for the evangelical measures and control variables presented in 
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Chapter Two.  Tables for Party ID and Racism present regression coefficients, predicted values, and p 
values; tables for the other dependent variables present marginal effects, predicted probabilities, and p 
values.  As in Chapter Two, the results are presented here for each of the three subgroups of dependent 
variables in turn.   
 
3.1 Trump Vote and Party ID 
 As before, the first subgroup includes the dependent variables that are intended to more overtly 
address political behavior.  Table 3.1 presents the results for the direct effects of the evangelical measures 
for both the individual (from Chapter Two) and county models for Trump Vote.  More – but still not all – 
of these measures reach statistical significance in the county models.  Statistical significance increases 
from 25.0% (2/8) in the individual models to 62.5% (5/8) in the county models.  Evangelical has a 
negative effect in both but is slightly stronger in the county model.  The RELTRAD measures are all 
positive, but none of the evangelical measures have effects strong enough to produce changes in the 
predicted outcomes.  Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect for Nondenominational Evangelical is cut 
in half in the county model.  Overall, as was the case in Chapter Two, evangelical identity simply does 











Table 3.1 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Trump Vote - Individual vs. County Models 




(p > 0.000) 
-.048 
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(p > 0.330) 
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(p > 0.518) 
.018 
.416/.434 
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Results for the control variables, including the Level 2 counterparts, are presented in Table 3.2.   
The individual level controls achieve statistical significance 100.0% of the time (12/12), while the county 
level variables do so 70.0% of the time (7/10).  The individual controls change the predicted outcome 
33.3% of the time (4/12), but the county level variables do so 40.0% of the time (4/10).  Both Age and 
Party ID increase the predicted probability of voting for Trump from below to above the .500 level.  
County Percent 62 does likewise, but County Percent HS drops the probability of doing so below .500.  
Not surprisingly, Party ID has the single largest impact on whether respondents voted for Trump.  Age 
has slightly larger effects than County Percent 62, while County Percent HS has stronger effects than 
Education.  Overall, the controls have a much stronger effect on the probability of voting for Trump than 
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(p > 0.305) 
County Population 
 
Turning now to Party ID, the most immediately apparent note is that all but one of the evangelical 
measures are statistically significant.  This is true for both the individual and county models, although the 
one measure that fails to achieve significance is different for each.  Thus, both are statistically significant 
87.5% of the time (7/8).  Both also change the predicted outcome 50.0% of the time (4/8), with Lutheran 
Missouri, Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, and Southern Baptist making 
respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale.  Nondenominational Evangelical and 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God have a coefficient representing one full level, while the others have a 




Table 3.3 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Party ID – Individual vs. County Models 
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Results for the control variables and their county level counterparts are presented in Table 3.4.  
All of them are statistically significant except County Percent 62 and County Population.  This makes the 
individual level variables statistically significant 100.0% of the time (10/10), while the county level 
variables are statistically significant 60.0% of the time (6/10).  Both change the predicted outcome 30.0% 
of the time (3/10), but they do so in different ways.  Race has the largest impact, with both White and 
County Percent White making respondents one level more Republican across the board.  County Percent 
White actually has a stronger effect and barely misses making respondents two levels more Republican 
(Figures 3.8 – 3.9).  County Percent High School has a slightly stronger effect than Education, although 
County Percent HS in the RELTRAD model is the only one that actually changes the predicted value (by 
making respondents one level less Republican).  The only other variable that changes the predicted value 
is Church Regular in the RELTRAD model, which makes respondents one level more Republican (but 
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just barely).  Ultimately, while evangelical identity makes a stronger showing here than for Trump Vote, 
race still appears to have stronger effects overall. 
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Figure 3.9 Effect of County Percent White - Party ID / RELTRAD 
 
 Overall, the effects of evangelical identity are stronger on Party ID than Trump Vote.  This is 
especially true in light of the fact that the evangelical identity measures fail to produce any changes in 
predicted outcomes for Trump Vote.  While it is certainly a closer question for the control variables, their 
effects are more consistent across both of these dependent variables than are the evangelical measures.  
This is particularly true with regard to changing the predicted outcome, as the controls do so 14 times 
compared to 8 for the evangelical measures. 
3.2 Gay Marriage and Pro-Life 
 This subgroup of dependent variables includes those for which Evangelicals tend to be associated 
with certain positions.  Table 3.5 presents the effects of evangelical identity on Gay Marriage.  All of the 
evangelical measures achieve statistical significance in the county models, including the two that failed to 
do so in the individual models.  Thus, the measures are statistically significant 100.0% of the time (8/8) in 
the county models and 75.0% of the time (6/8) in the individual models.  Both sets of models change the 
predicted outcomes 25.0% of the time (2/8).  They also do so in the same way, with Nondenominational 
Evangelical and Pentecostal Assemblies of God reducing the predicted probability of supporting Gay 
Marriage from above to below the .500 level (Southern Baptist barely misses in the individual model).  
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effects.  Still, the magnitude of the effects is sufficiently modest overall that adherents of the remaining 
groups, although perhaps not by a large margin, tend to be more probable than not to support gay 
marriage. 
 Meanwhile, the individual level control variables achieve statistical significance 100.0% of the 
time (12/12), while the county level variables do so 60.0% of the time (6/10).  The individual level 
controls also perform better in terms of changing the predicted outcomes, doing so 41.6% of the time 
(5/12) compared to 8.3% of the time (1/12) for the county level measures.  Age, Party ID, and Church 
Regular (RELTRAD) all reduce the predicted probability of supporting Gay Marriage from above to 
below the .500 level, while County Percent HS increases it from below to above that mark. These results 
are shown in Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.5 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Gay Marriage – Individual vs. County Models 




 (p > 0.004) 
-.017 
.654/.637 
(p > 0.030) 
Church of Christ 
  .058 
.650/.708 
(p > 0.692) 
.059 
.650/.709 




(p > 0.318) 
-.059 
.651/.592 




(p > 0.000) 
-.210 
.657/.447 
(p > 0.000) 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God 
- .239 
.652/.413 
(p > 0.000) 
-.241 
.652/.411 




(p > 0.000) 
-.136 
.657/.521 




(p > 0.000) 
-.082 
.651/.569 




(p > 0.000) 
- .107 
.652/.545 


















(p > 0.000) 
-.274 
.740/.466 
(p > 0.000) 
-.003 
.651/.648 
(p > 0.925) 
-.015 
.654/.639 
(p > 0.613) 




(p > 0.000) 
.140 
.574/.714 
(p > 0.000) 
.147 
.532/.679 
(p > 0.000) 
.200 
.489/.689 
(p > 0.000) 




(p > 0.000) 
.105 
.574/.679 
(p > 0.000) 
-.004 
.653/.649 
(p > 0.805) 
-.009 
.657/.648 
(p > 0.571) 




(p > 0.000) 
-.413 
.815/.402 






(p > 0.000) 
-.049 
.673/.624 







(p > 0.000) 
-.291 
.727/.436 
(p > 0.000) 
  
 
   -.013 
.655/.642 
(p > 0.002) 
-.029 
.661/.632 
(p > 0.000) 
Southern Baptist 
States 
   .020 
.646/.666 
(p > 0.000) 
.030 
.644/.674 
(p > 0.000) 
County Population 
 
 The analysis next turns to Pro-Life.  As explained in Chapter 2, this measure asks respondents 
whether they support the Pro-Life position of permitting abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or danger 
to the woman’s life.  Results for the evangelical identity measures are presented in Table 3.7. 
 The evangelical measures reach statistical significance 62.5% of the time (5/8) in the individual 
models and 75.0% of the time (6/8) in the county models.  That is reversed a bit for predicted outcome 
changes, with the individual models doing so 50.0% of the time (4/8) compared to 37.5% of the time (3/8) 
for the county models.  Southern Baptist and American Baptist increase the predicted probability of 
supporting the Pro-Life position from below to above the .500 level for both sets of models.  In addition, 
Nondenominational Evangelical and Pentecostal Assemblies of God do so for the individual models, 




Table 3.7 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Pro-Life - Individual vs. County Models 




(p > 0.934) 
-.093 
.474/.381 
(p > 0.000) 
Church of Christ 
- .045 
.455/.410 
(p > 0.220) 
-.029 
.455/.426 
(p > 0.156) 
Lutheran Missouri 
  .076 
.454/.530 
(p > 0.247) 
.082 
.454/.536 
(p > 0.000) 
Nondenominational 
Evangelical 
  .087 
.454/.541 
(p > 0.000) 
.042 
.454/.496 
(p > 0.000) 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God 
  .095 
.455/.550 
(p > 0.002) 
.001 
.455/.456 
(p > 0.981) 
Southern Baptist 
  .089 
.452/.541 
(p > 0.000) 
.057 
.452/.509 
(p > 0.000) 
American Baptist 
  .119 
.454/.573 
(p > 0.000) 
.106 
.454/.560 
(p > 0.000) 
Other Baptist 
  .045 
.454/.499 
(p > 0.000) 
.040 
.454/.494 
(p > 0.006) 
 
 
 With regard to the control variables, however, the individual level measures outperform the 
county level measures.  The individual measures are statistically significant 83.3% of the time (10/12), 
while the county measures are statistically significant 70.0% of the time (7/10).  Further, the individual 
measures change the predicted outcome 66.6% of the time (8/12), but the county measures change the 
predicted outcome only 16.6% of the time (2/12).  Education and White reduce the predicted probability 
of supporting the Pro-Life position from above to below the .500 level, while Party ID and Church 
Regular increase it from below to above that threshold.  County Percent HS, which reduces the predicted 
probability to below .500, is the only county level measure that changes the predicted outcome.  These 





















(p > 0.270) 
.009 
.452/.461 
(p > 0.455) 
-.042 
.465/.423 
(p > 0.250) 
-.038 
.464/.426 
(p > 0.283) 




(p > 0.000) 
-.176 
.550/.374 
(p > 0.000) 
-.154 
.577/.423 
(p > 0.000) 
-.183 
.600/.417 
(p > 0.000) 




(p > 0.000) 
-.101 
.528/.427 
(p > 0.000) 
.073 
.403/.476 
(p > 0.000) 
.075 
.402/.477 
(p > 0.000) 




(p > 0.000) 
.255 
.347/.602 






(p > 0.000) 
.076 
.420/.496 







(p > 0.000) 
.107 
.427/.534 
(p > 0.000) 
  
 
   .008 
.452/.460 
(p > 0.189) 
.015 
.450/.465 
(p > 0.007) 
Southern Baptist 
States 
   -.022 
.460/.438 
(p > 0.000) 
-.026 
.461/.435 
(p > 0.000) 
County Population 
 
 It is a bit of an aside, since County Percent White does not change the predicted outcome.  
However, White shifts predicted support from above to below the .500 level, but County Percent White 
has a modest positive effect.  This creates a rather unusual situation in which the Level 1 and Level 2 
measures produce effects with contradicting directions (Figures 3.10 – 3.11). 
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Figure 3.11 Effect of County Percent White - Pro-Life / RELTRAD 
 
 Overall, even though this subgroup includes dependent variables for which certain positions are 
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that of the evangelical measures.  Statistical significance is relatively comparable, but the controls 
perform better in terms of changing the predicted outcomes.  The controls do so a total of 16 times, while 
the evangelical identity measures do so only 11 times. 
3.3 Assault Rifle Ban, Dreamer, Racism 
 As encountered in Chapter Two, the analysis now reaches issues that may be likely to break down 
along ideological dimensions more so than religious dimensions.  First among these is the measure that 
asks respondents whether they support a ban on assault rifles.  Results for evangelical identity are 
presented in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Assault Rifle Ban - Individual vs. County Models 
 Individual County 
Evangelical 
  .011 
.663/.674 
(p > 0.006) 
.015 
.663/.678 
(p > 0.094) 
Church of Christ 
  .018 
.666/.684 
(p > 0.824) 
.021 
.666/.687 




(p > 0.105) 
-.033 
.667/.634 





(p > 0.004) 
-.058 
.669/.611 
(p > 0.000) 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God 
- .030 
.667/.637 
(p > 0.928) 
-.032 
.667/.635 




(p > 0.986) 
-.030 
.668/.638 
(p > 0.001) 
American Baptist 
  .017 
.666/.683 
(p > 0.610) 
.012 
.666/.678 




(p > 0.351) 
-.047 
.667/.620 
(p > 0.000) 
 
 Given the nature of the dependent variable, it is not surprising to see much less pronounced 
effects here.  The evangelical measures achieve statistical significance 50.0% of the time (4/8) in the 
county models but only 25.0% of the time (2/8) in the individual models.  Further, none of them change 
the predicted outcomes in any of the models.  This may be due at least in part to the fact that the level of 
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support for the ban is rather high across the board, which could work to mitigate the evangelical effects.  
Notably, however, the Evangelical measure has positive effects, while all of the RELTRAD measures 
have negative effects.  This means that – to the extent that it matters – the RELTRAD measures  produce 
a consistently more politically conservative position. 
 Similar effects are found when reviewing the impact of the Level 1 and Level 2 variables (Table 
3.10).  Support for the ban is consistently strong, and Party ID is the only variable that moves predicted 
support past the .500 level in either direction (strongly negative in that case).  Still, support for the ban 
remains above .500 for all except the strongest levels of Republican identity (Figure 3.12).  Statistical 
significance levels are rather comparable, coming in at 66.6% (8/12) for the Level 1 variables and 60.0% 
(6/10) for the Level 2 variables. 













(p > 0.000) 
.245 
.570/.815 
(p > 0.000) 
.050 
.654/.704 
(p > 0.074) 
.049 
.654/.703 
(p > 0.095) 




(p > 0.000) 
.082 
.622/.704 
(p > 0.000) 
.140 
.554/.694 
(p > 0.000) 
.151 
.545/.696 
(p > 0.000) 




(p > 0.470) 
-.002 
.668/.666 
(p > 0.724) 
-.140 
.764/.624 
(p > 0.000) 
-.141 
.765/.624 






(p > 0.000) 
-.496 
.863/.367 






(p > 0.000) 
-.171 
.747/.576 






(p > 0.153) 
-.006 
.668/.662 
(p > 0.220) 
  
 
   -.019 
.673/.654 
(p > 0.000) 
-.021 
.674/.653 
(p > 0.000) 
Southern Baptist 
States 
   .019 
.663/.682 
(p > 0.093) 
.021 
.662/.683 







Figure 3.12 Effect of Party ID - Assault Rifle Ban / RELTRAD 
 
 Proceeding on to Dreamer, recall that it is an immigration measure asking respondents whether 
they support granting legal status to persons who were brought to the United States illegally as children 
but have since graduated from high school in the United States.  Results for the evangelical measures are 
shown in Table 3.11. 
 The majority of the measures are statistically significant, which reflects little change from the 
individual to the county models.  The proportion of statistical significance is 62.5% (5/8) for the 
individual models and 75.0% (6/8) for the county models.  All of the measures begin from essentially the 
same point for predicted probability of Dreamer support, just below the .500 level, but they diverge from 
there.  Evangelical (individual and county) and Church of Christ (county only) have a positive effect and 
shift the predicted probability of support from below to above the .500 level.  Thus, the predicted 
outcomes change 12.5% of the time (1/8) for the individual models and 25.0% of the time (2/8) for the 
county models.  The remaining effects are negative, which means that the RELTRAD measures except 
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Table 3.11 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Dreamer - Individual vs. County Models 




(p > 0.003) 
.054 
.464/.518 
(p > 0.000) 
Church of Christ 
.023 
.474/.497 
(p > 0.081) 
.046 
.474/.520 




(p > 0.004) 
-.036 
.475/.439 




(p > 0.324) 
-.009 
.474/.465 
(p > 0.382) 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God 
.001 
.474/.475 
(p > 0.836) 
.025 
.474/.499 




(p > 0.000) 
-.069 
.477/.408 




(p > 0.001) 
-.058 
.475/.417 




(p > 0.000) 
-.088 
.476/.388 
(p > 0.000) 
 
  
 Results for the Level 1 and Level 2 variables are presented in Table 3.12.  The Level 1 variables 
achieve statistical significance 91.6% of the time (11/12), while the Level 2 variables do so only 60.0% of 
the time (6/10).  This comparison holds for changing predicted outcomes, as the Level 1 variables do so 
33.3% of the time (4/12) and the Level 2 variables do so 20.0% of the time (2/10).  In keeping with the 
pattern seen previously, Party ID has the largest impact, with only those who at least Lean Democrat 
remaining above the .500 level (Figure 3.13).  Beyond this, the measures of age and education generate 
rather interesting results.  County Percent 62 moves the needle in a negative direction, while Age misses 
only because its beginning point is just under .500 (Figures 3.14 – 3.15).  Education changes the predicted 
outcome in a positive direction, while County Percent HS barely misses doing so (Figures 3.16 – 3.17).   
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Table 3.12 Effects of Level 1 and Level 2 Variables - Dreamer 












(p > 0.000) 
-.047 
.491/.444 
(p > 0.000) 
-.130 
.506/.376 
(p > 0.000) 
-.132 
.506/.374 
(p > 0.000) 




(p > 0.000) 
.169 
.384/.553 
(p > 0.000) 
.100 
.395/.495 
(p > 0.000) 
.113 
.385/.498 
(p > 0.000) 




(p > 0.001) 
.023 
.458/.481 
(p > 0.000) 
.017 
.462/.479 
(p > 0.266) 
.014 
.464/.478 






(p > 0.000) 
-.423 
.659/.236 






(p > 0.002) 
-.010 
.479/.469 






(p > 0.449) 
-.027 
.481/.454 
(p > 0.000) 
  
 
   .015 
.469/.484 
(p > 0.004) 
.014 
.469/.483 
(p > 0.008) 
Southern Baptist 
States 
   .017 
.471/.488 
(p > 0.052) 
.018 
.470/.488 
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 The final dependent variable to be considered is Racism.  As explained in Chapter Two, this 
measure asks respondents to rate (on a five point scale) the extent to which they agree with the statement 
that racial problems in the United States are rare, isolated situations.  Thus, higher scores represent lesser 
willingness to accept racism as a widespread problem.  Results for the evangelical measures are presented 
in Table 3.13. 
Table 3.13 Effects of Evangelical Identity on Racism - Individual vs. County Models 




(p > 0.000) 
-.343 
2.352/2.009 
(p > 0.000) 
Church of Christ 
.149 
2.282/2.249  
(p > 0.370) 
-.048 
2.282/2.234 




(p > 0.002) 
.179 
2.279/2.457 





(p > 0.092) 
.060 
2.279/2.340 
(p > 0.042) 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God 
-.031 
2.282/2.245 
(p > 0.816) 
-.081 
2.282/2.201 




(p > 0.119) 
.052 
2.279/2.331 




(p > 0.004) 
.250 
2.279/2.530 




(p > 0.906) 
.047 
2.280/2.327 
(p > 0.244) 
 
 As not atypical for the last group of dependent variables (those without clear religious 
dimensions), only about half achieve statistical significance.  The proportion is 37.5% (3/8) for the 
individual models and 50.0% (4/8) for the county models.  The effects are rather limited overall, with 
none of them producing a different predicted value on the Racism scale.  Evangelical has a negative 
effect, while the others have a positive effect.  As noted in previous sections, this means that, while the 
effects may not be particularly strong, the RELTRAD groups trend toward more politically conservative 
positions. 
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 Results for the Level 1 and Level 2 variables are presented in Table 3.14.  The Level 1 variables 
achieve statistical significance 100.0% of the time (12/12), while the Level 2 variables do so 60.0% of the 
time (6/10). 













(p > 0.000) 
-.004 
2.397/2.098 
(p > 0.000) 
.000 
2.284/2.272 
(p > 0.881) 
.000 
2.286/2.268 
(p > 0.824) 




(p > 0.000) 
-.028 
2.360/2.218 
(p > 0.000) 
-.003 
2.404/2.250 
(p > 0.033) 
-.004 
2.449/2.238 






(p > 0.000) 
.092 
2.212/2.303 
(p > 0.000) 
.002 
2.171/2.324 
(p > 0.002) 
.002 
2.166/2.326 






(p > 0.000) 
.191 
1.779/2.927 






(p > 0.000) 
.263 
2.166/2.429 






(p > 0.000) 
.184 
2.234/2.418 
(p > 0.000) 
  
 
   -.011 
2.285/2.274 
(p > 0.490) 
-.001 
2.282/2.281 
(p > 0.964) 
Southern Baptist 
States 
   1.15e-08 
2.269/2.237 
(p > 0.003) 
1.06e-08 
2.270/2.323 
(p > 0.008) 
County Population 
 
 Party ID again has the strongest effects.  It is the only variable to produce a change in the 
predicted outcome and barely misses raising respondents two levels on the Racism scale.  While their 
effects are in opposite directions, Age (negative) and Male (positive) have the next largest magnitude of 
effects.  The measures for education (negative) and race (positive) also run in opposite directions, but it is 
notable that the Level 2 measures (County Percent HS and County Percent White) have stronger effects 
than their Level 1 counterparts.  Church Regular also has a positive effect, which means that respondents 
who attend church at least weekly trend toward the more politically conservative position. 
 Overall, then, it is not unexpected that the evangelical measures are outperformed by the control 
variables for this subgroup.  This is particularly true with regard to changing the predicted outcome.  The 
91 
evangelical measures do so a total of three times across this subgroup, while the control variables do so a 
total of ten times. 
3.4 Summary 
 As at the conclusion of Chapter Two, it is useful to compare the relative impact of the different 
types of variables.  If a giant table were being constructed, including both the individual and county 
models would result in a total of 164 cells for the six individual level control variables.  The controls are 
statistically significant 92.1% of the time (151/164) and result in a different predicted outcome 34.1% of 
the time (56/164).  Doing the same for the measures of evangelical identity would result in a total of 112 
cells (not including models with Black respondents dropped).  The evangelical measures are statistically 
significant 62.5% of the time (70/112) and change the predicted outcome 15.2% of the time (17/112).  As 
was the case in Chapter Two, which includes only the individual models, this indicates that the impact of 
the control variables is much more consistent than the evangelical identity measures across the range of 
dependent variables. 
 With this context established, it is now useful to compare the overall impact of these measures 
with that of the Level 2 variables (County Percent 62, County Percent HS, County Percent White, 
Southern Baptist States, and County Population).  Out of a possible 70 cells, the Level 2 variables are 
statistically significant 62.8% of the time (44/70) and change the predicted outcome 17.1% of the time 
(12/70).  While this does not match the performance of the controls, it is still a bit stronger than the 
overall performance of the evangelical measures. 
 Digging a bit deeper, it is instructive to compare the magnitude of the effects of Level 2 variables 
to that of their Level 1 counterparts.  This involves three pairs of variables: County Percent 62 / Age, 
County Percent HS / Education, and County Percent White / White.  In order to keep the comparison 
consistent, pairings are included only when both variables achieve statistical significance for a given 
dependent variable.  For sake of clarity, this means that variables can still be included here if they fail to 
change the predicted outcome. 
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 This reveals that the education pairing (County Percent HS / Education) is by far the strongest of 
the three, with both measures reaching statistical significance for all seven dependent variables.  
Comparing the magnitude of the effects reveals that the Level 1 effect (Education) is stronger for one 
dependent variable (Dreamer) and approximately equal for another dependent variable (ProLife).  
However, the Level 2 effect (County Percent HS) is stronger for all five of the remaining dependent 
variables (Trump Vote, Party ID, Gay Marriage, Assault Rifle Ban, and Racism). 
 The next strongest performer is the race pairing (County Percent White / White), both of which 
are statistically significant for four of the seven dependent variables.  The Level 1 effect (White) is 
stronger for one of the four (ProLife), while the Level 2 effect is stronger for the other three (Trump Vote, 
Party ID, and Racism). 
 The third of the three pairings (County Percent 62 / Age) is statistically significant for two of the 
seven dependent variables.  This one is an even split, with the Level 1 effect (Age) being stronger for 
Trump Vote and the Level 2 effect (County Percent 62) being stronger for Dreamer. 
 The Level 2 variables also perform very well when compared to the magnitude of the effects for 
the evangelical measures.  At least one of these three demonstrates an effect that is stronger than the 
strongest evangelical effect for five out of the seven dependent variables (all except Gay Marriage and 
Racism).  Both County Percent 62 and County Percent HS do so for Trump Vote (County Percent White 
barely misses); County Percent White does so for Party ID; County Percent HS does so for ProLife; both 
County Percent HS and County Percent White do so for Assault Rifle Ban; and both County Percent 62 
and County Percent HS do so for Dreamer.  Overall, this means that County Percent HS outperforms the 
strongest evangelical measure for four out of the seven dependent variables, while County Percent 62 and 
County Percent White do so for two dependent variables each.  Obviously, then, environmental factors 
cannot be discounted as determinants of political behavior. 
 Finally, it must be noted that Age, Party ID, and Church Regular actually have a stronger effect 
than the strongest evangelical measure in the Gay Marriage models, while Party ID does so in the Racism 
models.  This means that, as was the case in Chapter Two, all seven hypotheses are supported by these 
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results, in that for each dependent variable there is at least one other relevant variable with an overall 
stronger impact on the outcome than even the strongest of the evangelical identity measures.  Thus, it is 
difficult to argue for a predominant role for evangelical identity as a determinant of political behavior. 
 In light of these results, it is worth considering the possibility that evangelical identity fits this 
puzzle in a different manner.  More specifically, is it possible that the real nature of any relationship here 
is that both political behavior and evangelical identity are products of the same factors?  This prospect is 



















4 DETERMINANTS OF EVANGELICAL IDENTITY 
 In this chapter the evangelical measures switch roles.  That is, the measures of evangelical 
identity have been used thus far as independent variables, but in these models they become dependent 
variables.  As explained at the end of Chapter Three, the purpose of this is to explore the possibility that 
the other independent variables may help explain both political behavior and the adoption of evangelical 
identity.  Results showing the effects of the county indicators on the adoption of evangelical identity are 
presented in Table 4.1.  As before, statistical significance is indicated by shaded cells. 
















p > 0.978 
.030 
.181/.211 
p > 0.158 
-.183 
.353/.170 
p > 0.000 
.083 
.170/.253 
p > 0.000 
-.060 
.215/.155 
p > 0.012 
Church of Christ 
.010 
.006/.016 
p > 0.138 
.008 
.003/.011 
p > 0.029 
.008 
.002/.010 
p > 0.057 
-.004 
.009/.005 
p > 0.000 
.001 
.008/.009 




p > 0.596 
.014 
.005/.019 
p > 0.000 
.014 
.004/.018 
p > 0.009 
-.001 
.014-.013 
p > 0.363 
.004 
.013-.017 





p > 0.003 
.019 
.020/.039 
p > 0.000 
.008 
.026/.034 
p > 0.319 
.003 
.031/.034 
p > 0.137 
.001 
.032-.033 
p > 0.579 
Pentecostal 
Assemblies of God 
.000 
.009/.009 
p > 0.937 
.006 
.005/.011 
p > 0.037 
-.009 
.017/.008 
p > 0.068 
.000 
.009/.009 
p > 0.546 
-.004 
.010/.006 




p > 0.087 
-.025 
.064/.039 
p > 0.005 
-.094 
.126/.032 
p > 0.000 
.065 
.019/.084 
p > 0.000 
-.028 
.051-.023 




p > 0.447 
-.005 
.013/.008 
p > 0.125 
.002 
.008/.010 
p > 0.662 
-.001 
.010-.009 
p > 0.128 
-.006 
.011-.005 




p > 0.010 
-.007 
.024/.017 
p > 0.090 
-.016 
.032/.016 
p > 0.037 
.010 
.015/.025 
p > 0.000 
-.005 
.020/.015 
p > 0.126 
 
 A quick check of overall performance regarding statistical significance reveals that the county 
indicators are significant in eighteen out of forty cells, which represents approximately forty-five percent 
overall.  More specifically, three of the indicators are statistically significant for at least half of the 
measures of evangelical identity.  These are County Percent White (five out of eight), County Percent 
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High School (four out of eight), and Southern Baptist States (four out of eight).  Each of these will be 
discussed more fully in turn. 
 Before proceeding further, however, it should be noted that it is not particularly useful to discuss 
“moving the needle” in this context, since so few respondents identity with any of the measures of 
evangelical (the proportion is less than fifteen percent for even the broadest measure).  Thus, the 
discussion here will focus on the relative magnitude of the effect the county indicators have on the 
probability of adopting the respective evangelical identities. 
 As noted above, County Percent White is significant for five out of the eight measures of 
evangelical identity (62.5%).  The effects are positive for four out of the five and negative in the other.  
The largest positive effect is .019 (Nondenominational Evangelical), while the only negative effect is  
-.025 (Southern Baptist).  These are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.  Interestingly, the predicted probability 
of adopting either of these identities is identical at .039. 
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Figure 4.2 Effect of County Percent White - Southern Baptist 
 
 
 Next, County Percent HS and Southern Baptist States are significant in four of the eight measures 
of evangelical identity.  Three of the four evangelical measures are the same (Evangelical, Southern 
Baptist, and Other Baptist), while the fourth differs (Church of Christ for Southern Baptist States, 
Lutheran Missouri for County Percent High School).   
 Looking first at County Percent HS, the effects are negative on three of the evangelical measures 
(Evangelical, Southern Baptist, and Other Baptist) and positive on the fourth (Lutheran Missouri).  The 
positive effect for Lutheran Missouri is .014, while the strongest negative effect is for Evangelical (-.183).  
These results are presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.  The highest predicted probability of adopting one of 
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Figure 4.3 Effect of County Percent HS - Evangelical 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Effect of County Percent HS - Lutheran Missouri 
 
 Turning now to Southern Baptist States, the effects are positive on three of the evangelical 
measures (Evangelical, Southern Baptist, and Other Baptist) and negative on the fourth (Church of 
Christ).  The strongest positive effect is for Evangelical (.083), while the negative effect for Church of 
Christ is -.004.  These results are presented in Figures 4.5 and 4.6.  The highest predicted probability of 
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Figure 4.5 Effect of Southern Baptist States - Evangelical 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Effect of Southern Baptist States - Church of Christ 
 
 Before moving on, it is necessary to establish greater context with regard to the magnitude of 
these effects.  For example, the smallest positive marginal effect of County Percent White is .006 
(Pentecostal Assemblies of God).  However, this more than doubles the predicted probability of adopting 
that identity (.005/.011).  Indeed, the smallest proportional positive effect of County Percent White is just 
under double the predicted probability of adopting Nondenominational Evangelical (.020/.039).  Further, 
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of adopting that identity (.003/.011; Figure 4.7).  The same is true for Lutheran Missouri (.014; 
.005/.019). 
 
Figure 4.7 Effect of County Percent White - Church of Christ 
 
 County Percent HS produces similar results.  The only positive effect is for Lutheran Missouri 
(.014), but that more than quadruples the probability of adopting this identity (.004/.018; Figure 4.8).  The 
largest proportional negative effect is for Southern Baptist (-.094), which reduces the predicted 
probability of adopting the identity by almost three-fourths (.126/.032; Figure 4.9).  The other negative 
effects (Evangelical .353/.170; Other Baptist .032/.016) reduce the predicted probability of adopting the 
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Figure 4.9 Effect of County Percent HS - Southern Baptist 
 
 As for Southern Baptist States, the only negative effect is -.004 for Church of Christ, but this cuts 
the predicted probability of adopting the identity in half (.009/.005).  The proportional positive effects 
range from a low of increasing the predicted probability of adopting Evangelical identity by about fifty 
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(.019/.084; Figure 4.11).  Thus, while these marginal effects appear small, many of them are quite large 
from a proportional perspective. 
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 After reviewing these results, it is now useful to explore the impact of the county indicators on 
the two major measures of political behavior, Trump Vote and Party ID.  These results are presented in 
Table 4.2. 
 
















p > 0.000 
.062 
.371/.433 
p > 0.000 
-.209 
.585/.376 
p > 0.000 
.013 
.412/.425 
p > 0.002 
-.007 
.418/.411 




p > 0.210 
.016 
2.536/3.972 
p > 0.000 
-.014 
4.130/3.406 
p > 0.000 
.257 
3.466/3.723 
p > 0.000 
-5.47e-09 
3.563/3.535 
p > 0.672 
 
 
 It is immediately apparent that the three county indicators with the largest impact on evangelical 
identity are all highly statistically significant for both Trump Vote and Party ID.  While it fails to move 
the predicted probability of voting for Trump from below to above the .500 level, County Percent White 
has a noticeable positive effect on vote choice and barely misses making respondents two levels more 
Republican on the Party ID scale (Figure 4.12).  County Percent HS has consistently strong negative 
effects, reducing the predicted probability of voting for Trump from above to below .500 and making 
respondents one level less Republican on the Party ID scale (Figures 4.13 and 4.14).  The impact of 
Southern Baptist States is the weakest of the three, but the effects are consistently positive.  Thus, it is 
apparent that the Level 2 measures of race and education have a significant impact on both political 
behavior and the adoption of evangelical identity. 
103 
 
























10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
CountyPercentWhite



















48 53 58 63 68 73 78 83 88 93 98
CountyPercentHS
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
104 
 
Figure 4.14 Effect of County Percent HS - Party ID 
 
 Turning now to the effects of the Level 1 variables on evangelical identity, those results are 
presented in Table 4.3.  They perform more strongly than the Level 2 variables in overall statistical 
significance, reaching that level in 72.9% of cells (35/48).  They also perform better individually, with all 
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Table 4.3 Effects of Level 1 Variables - Evangelical Identity 
 
 






p > 0.000 
-.071 
.241/.170 
p > 0.000 
.154 
.138/.292 
p > 0.000 
-.034 
.218/.184 
p > 0.000 
-.058 
.245/.187 
p > 0.000 
.303 
.118/.421 
p > 0.000 
Church of Christ 
.029 
.003/.032 
p > 0.000 
.007 
.005/.012 
p > 0.000 
-.004 
.010/.006 
p > 0.002 
.000 
.008/.008 
p > 0.446 
.004 
.005/.009 
p > 0.000 
.001 
.008/.009 




p > 0.000 
.004 
.012/.016 
p > 0.009 
.014 
.008/.022 
p > 0.000 
.001 
.013/.014 
p > 0.878 
.008 
.007/.015 
p > 0.000 
-.001 
.014/.013 





p > 0.025 
.007 
.029/.036 
p > 0.001 
.045 
.015/.060 
p > 0.000 
-.003 
.034/.031 
p > 0.030 
-.010 
.040/.030 
p > 0.000 
.051 
.017/.068 
p > 0.000 




p > 0.114 
-.007 
.013/.006 
p > 0.000 
.013 
.004/.017 
p > 0.000 
.000 
.009/.009 
p > 0.847 
-.001 
.010/.009 
p > 0.363 
.014 
.005/.019 




p > 0.000 
-.018 
.055/.037 
p > 0.000 
.036 
.030/.066 
p > 0.000 
.003 
.044/.047 
p > 0.091 
-.004 
.048/.044 
p > 0.110 
.033 
.035/.068 




p > 0.018 
-.008 
.014/.006 
p > 0.000 
-.003 
.011/.008 
p > 0.021 
-.001 
.010/.009 
p > 0.088 
-.010 
.017/.007 
p > 0.000 
.006 
.008/.014 




p > 0.832 
-.016 
.028/.012 
p > 0.000 
.002 
.018/.020 
p > 0.141 
-.007 
.022/.015 
p > 0.000 
-.017 
.031/.014 
p > 0.000 
.002 
.018/.020 
p > 0.207 
 
 While there is no Level 1 corollary for Southern Baptist States, both Education (County Percent 
HS) and White (County Percent White) perform well.  Education is the only Level 1 variable that is 
statistically significant for all eight measures of evangelical; the effects are positive for three and negative 
for five.  The positive marginal effects are small (.004-.007), but proportionately they are stronger.  The 
.04 is for Lutheran Missouri, which increases the predicted probability of adopting the identity by one 
third (.012/.016; Figure 4.15).  The .07 is for both Church of Christ, which more than doubles the 
predicted probability (.005/.012; Figure 4.16), and Nondenominational Evangelical, which increases the 
predicted probability by about one fourth (.029/.036).  The negative marginal effects range from -.007 
(Pentecostal Assemblies of God) to -.071 (Evangelical).  However, the proportional effects reduce the 
predicted probabilities from just over one fourth for Evangelical (.241/.170) to more than one half for 
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Pentecostal Assemblies of God (.013/.006), American Baptist (.014/.006), and Other Baptist (.028/.012).  
These results are shown in Figures 4.17 – 4.20. 
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 White is statistically significant for six of eight measures of evangelical, all except Pentecostal 
Assemblies of God and Southern Baptist.  The effects are positive for two of the measures (Church of 
Christ and Lutheran Missouri) and negative for the rest (Evangelical, Nondenominational Evangelical, 
American Baptist, and Other Baptist).  The positive marginal effects are small (.004 and .008, 
respectively), but they essentially double the predicted probability of adopting those identities.  The 
negative marginal effects range from -.010 (Nondenominational Evangelical and American Baptist) to  
-.058 (Evangelical), but the proportional reductions in predicted probability range from just under one 
fourth (Evangelical) to more than half (American Baptist).   
 As noted above, several of the other Level 1 variables have significant effects on evangelical 
identity.  Age is statistically significant for six of the eight evangelical measures, while Church Regular is 
significant for five of them.  Both have consistently positive effects.  The proportional effects of Age 
range from about one third (Nondenominational Evangelical) to more than ten times (Church of Christ).  
The proportional effects of Church Regular range from just under double (Southern Baptist, American 
Baptist) to more than triple (Evangelical, Nondenominational Evangelical, and Pentecostal Assemblies of 
God).  Finally, Party ID is statistically significant for seven of the eight evangelical measures, with five 
positive effects and two negative ones.  While the negative effects are modest (Church of Christ .010/.006 
and American Baptist .014/.006), the positive effects range as high as four times the predicted probability 
(Nondenominational Evangelical .015/.060 and Pentecostal Assemblies of God .004/.017). 
 Moving on to the results for the Level 1 variables on Trump Vote and Party ID, those results are 
presented in Table 4.4.  Of course, Party ID is not used as an independent variable in the model in which 
it is the dependent variable.  Overall, these variables are statistically significant 100% of the time (11/11). 
Table 4.4 Effects of Level 1 Variables - Trump Vote and Party ID 
 







p > 0.000 
-.125 
.488/.363 
p > 0.000 
.885 
.044/.929 
p > 0.000 
.030 
.401/.431 
p > 0.000 
.050 
.376/.426 
p > 0.000 
.044 
.405/.449 




p > 0.000 
-.100 
3.827/3.324 




p > 0.000 
1.047 
2.802/3.850 
p > 0.000 
.710 
3.370/4.081 
p > 0.000 
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 Staying with corollaries of the notable Level 2 variables discussed above, White has the largest 
effect of any Level 1 variable on Party ID.  Simply being White makes respondents just over one level 
more Republican on the Party ID scale, but neither White nor Education changes the predicted outcome 
otherwise.  As has consistently been the case, their effects are in opposite directions. 
 Meanwhile, it is not surprising that Party ID has – by far – the largest impact on Trump Vote.  
However, Age also has a significant impact and increases the predicted probability of voting for Trump 
from below to above the .500 level.  In addition, Church Regular makes respondents one level more 
Republican on the Party ID scale. 
 Overall, then, the basic contention that both political behavior and the adoption of evangelical 
identity are shaped by common factors is supported by these results.  In particular, measures for race and 
education level – both Level 1 and Level 2 – have a significant impact on both areas.  County Percent 
White makes respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale; it also roughly doubles the 
predicted probability of becoming Pentecostal Assemblies of God and Nondenominational Evangelical 
and quadruples the probability of becoming Church of Christ and Lutheran Missouri.  White makes 
respondents almost two levels more Republican on the Party ID scale and doubles the probability of 
identifying as Lutheran Missouri and Church of Christ.  However, it also reduces the probability of 
adopting some measures of evangelical, ranging from roughly one-fourth for Evangelical to one-half for 
American Baptist. 
 County Percent HS makes respondents one level less Republican on the Party ID scale and 
reduces the probability of voting for Trump from above to below the .500 level.  It also roughly 
quadruples the probability of identifying as Lutheran Missouri but reduces by at least half the probability 
of identifying as Evangelical, Southern Baptist, and American Baptist.  Education has a variety of effects 
on evangelical identity, ranging from doubling the probability of becoming Church of Christ to reducing 
by half the probability of becoming Pentecostal Assemblies of God, American Baptist, and Other Baptist.  
Also, while it fails to “move the needle,” the marginal effects of Education reduce the predicted values by 
about one-fourth for both Party ID and Trump Vote. 
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 Finally, other Level 1 variables have significant and consistently positive impacts on both areas.  
Age moves the predicted probability of voting for Trump from below to above the .500 level.  It also 
increases the probability of adopting certain evangelical identities, ranging from about one-third for 
Nondenominational Evangelical to just over ten times for Church of Christ.  In addition, Church Regular 
makes respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale and increases the probability of 
adopting certain evangelical identities, ranging from roughly double for Southern Baptist and American 
Baptist and triple for Evangelical, Nondenominational Evangelical, and Pentecostal Assemblies of God.   
 All things considered, then, there is considerable evidence to suggest that both political behavior 
and evangelical identity can be understood in terms of common factors.  In conjunction with the previous 
results, this indicates that continuing to view evangelical identity as a determinant of political behavior 
















 Before summarizing the results presented in the preceding chapters, it may be useful to first 
briefly establish the context that gave rise to this research.  From my vantage point in the rural South, I 
have long been an observer of politics and political behavior.  Something that has been of particular 
interest to me is the extent to which “regular folks” and “church folks” are different in their politics.  
Despite my efforts, a few isolated individuals aside, I have never been able to identify any such 
difference.  To my observation, the “church folks” display the same yard signs, express the same views, 
and (presumably) vote the same as the proverbial folks who attend church only at Christmas and Easter, if 
they ever attend at all.  This observation applies mostly to Evangelicals, who make up – by far – the 
predominant religious groups in my world. 
 My interest in these matters was heightened with the candidacy of Donald Trump in 2016.  
Surely, I thought, his arrogance, vulgar language, and boorish behavior would create some separation 
between at least some of the church folks and the regular folks.  If that happened, I was never able to find 
it.  Despite the fact that his own behavior was virtually the complete opposite of what they claimed to 
hold up as their example, the church folks embraced Trump just as enthusiastically as did the regular 
folks.  For whatever it might be worth, Trump took 77.7% of the vote in my county in 2016 (he increased 
that to 78.1% of a larger turnout in 2020). 
 Of course, this picture of Evangelicals walking in lockstep with most everyone else is strikingly 
different from the picture painted by political scientists, who spill much (digital!) ink trying to explain 
why Evangelicals are so different from everyone else.  Could it be that the Evangelicals in my world just 
happen to be very different from those in other places?  Or could it be that we have gotten ahead of 
ourselves in terms of the impact on political behavior we ascribe to evangelical identity? 
 This is the dilemma that gave rise to the essential contention explored here.  Simply put, that 
contention is that evangelical identity is not the predominant factor in determining the political behavior 
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of Evangelicals.  While not necessarily irrelevant, it is outweighed by other relevant variables such as 
individual characteristics and environmental factors. 
 With this in mind, recall the overall results discussed in Chapter Two, in which the models 
include only Level 1 variables.  Overall, the control variables are statistically significant 90.2% of the 
time (111/123), while the evangelical measures are statistically significant 55.5% of the time (35/63).  In 
addition, the control variables change the predicted outcome 35.8% of the time (44/123), while the 
evangelical measures change the predicted outcome 20.6% of the time (13/63). 
 Similar patterns are observed once Level 2 variables are added to the models in Chapter Three.  
There, the control variables are statistically significant 92.1% of the time (151/164), while the Level 2 
variables are significant 62.8% of the time (44/70).  The evangelical measures bring up the rear, reaching 
significance only 53.6% of the time (60/112).  Further, the control variables change the predicted outcome 
34.1% of the time (56/164), while the Level 2 variables change the predicted outcome 17.1% of the time 
(12/70).  Again, the evangelical measures bring up the rear, changing the predicted outcome only 15.2% 
of the time (17/112). 
 Of course, these results represent only the aggregate performance of the different types of 
variables.  Thus, it is useful to explore the relative effects of the evangelical measures on a dependent 
variable by dependent variable basis.  As before, the analysis that follows takes the magnitude of the 
strongest marginal effect of any of the evangelical measures – regardless of whether the effect is positive 
or negative – and compares it to the magnitude of the marginal effects of the independent variables.  Of 
course, only variables reaching statistical significance (p > .05) are considered.   
 For Level 1 models (Chapter Two), the marginal effects of the independent variables are 
presented in the following order: Evangelical, Evangelical / Black respondents removed, and RELTRAD.  
For Level 2 models (Chapter Three), the marginal effects of the independent variables are presented in the 
following order: Evangelical and RELTRAD (the Evangelical / Black respondents removed models are 
not used with the Level 2 variables, as they made little difference with the Level 1 variables). 
 
114 
Level 1 Models 
 Trump Vote.  The strongest evangelical effect is Nondenominational Evangelical (.067).  This is 
exceeded by Age (.188, .202, .184), Education (-.124, -.136, -.135), and Party ID (.880, .879, .884). 
 Party ID.  The strongest evangelical effect is Nondenominational Evangelical (1.091).  This is 
exceeded by White (1.177, 1.149; These results are for the Evangelical and RELTRAD models, as the 
marginal effect for Evangelical / Black respondents removed does not exceed the effect for the 
evangelical measure). 
 Gay Marriage.  The strongest evangelical effect is Nondenominational Evangelical (-.249).  This 
is exceeded by Age (-.266, -.261, -.271), Party ID (-.391, -.410, -.415), and Church Regular (-.297 
RELTRAD). 
 Pro-Life.  The strongest evangelical effect is American Baptist (.119).  This is exceeded by 
Education (-.169, -.161, -.185) and Party ID (.247, .265, .259). 
 Assault Rifle Ban.  The strongest evangelical effect is Nondenominational Evangelical (-.089).  
This is exceeded by Age (.242, .239, .244), Education (.095 RELTRAD), Party ID (-.500, -.508, -.504), 
and Male (-.169, -.179, -.168). 
 Dreamer.  The strongest evangelical effect is Other Baptist (-.084).  This is exceeded by 
Education (.167, .166, .175) and Party ID (-.418, -.442, -.424). 
 Racism.  The strongest evangelical effect is Evangelical (-.290).  This is exceeded by Age (-.303 
RELTRAD) and Party ID (1.136, 1.123, 1.148). 
 Thus, all seven hypotheses are supported by these results, as there is not a single dependent 
variable for which the strongest effect of any of the evangelical measures is not exceeded by the effects of 
at least one of the other independent variables.  Party ID is the most consistent performer, exceeding the 
evangelical effect in every case.  Age and Education are the next most consistent performers, with each of 




Level 2 Models 
 These models keep the Level 1 variables and add the Level 2 county indicators.  Marginal effects 
are presented in the order described above. 
 Trump Vote.  The strongest evangelical effect is Southern Baptist (.064).  This is exceeded by 
Age (.177, .177), County Percent 62 (.144, .144), Education (-.121, -.123), County Percent HS (-.185, -
.202), and Party ID (.881, .882). 
 Party ID.  The strongest evangelical effect is Pentecostal Assemblies of God (1.017).  This is 
exceeded by White (1.072, 1.034) and County Percent White (1.370, 1.392). 
 Gay Marriage.  The strongest evangelical effect is Pentecostal Assemblies of God (-.241).  This is 
exceeded by Age (-.270, -.274), Party ID (-.388, -.413), and Church Regular RELTRAD (-.291). 
 Pro-Life.  The strongest evangelical effect is American Baptist (.106).  This is exceeded by 
Education (-.162, -.176), County Percent HS (-.154, -.183), Party ID (.243, .255), and Church Regular 
RELTRAD (.107). 
 Assault Rifle Ban.  The strongest evangelical effect is Nondenominational Evangelical (-.058).  
This is exceeded by Age (.242, .245), Education (.075, .082), County Percent HS (.140, .151), County 
Percent White (-.140, -.141), Party ID (-.494, -.496), and Male (-.171, -.171). 
 Dreamer.  The strongest evangelical effect is Other Baptist (-.088).  This is exceeded by County 
Percent 62 (-.130, -.132), Education (.161, .169), County Percent HS (.100, .113), and Party ID (-.419,  
-.423). 
 Racism.  The strongest evangelical effect is Evangelical (-.343).  This is exceeded by Party ID 
(1.113, 1.148).  (Note: The effect of Evangelical is somewhat stronger than the next strongest evangelical 
effect, which is American Baptist (.250).  If this measure is used, both Age (-.279, -.299) and Male (.266, 
.263) also exceed the evangelical effect.) 
 After completing this overview, the key takeaways are somewhat straightforward.  First, there is 
literally not a single dependent variable in either set of models for which the magnitude of the strongest 
effect of any of the evangelical measures is not exceeded by the magnitude of the effect of something 
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else.  Further, specifically with regard to the Level 2 models, there are only two dependent variables (Gay 
Marriage and Racism) for which the magnitude of the strongest effect of any of the evangelical measures 
is not exceeded by the magnitude of the effect of at least one Level 2 variable.  Finally, it should be noted 
that the marginal effects of the other variables listed not only exceed those of the strongest evangelical 
effect but that they frequently do so by a wide margin.  Thus, all seven hypotheses are supported by the 
results of both the Level 1 and Level 2 models. 
 Further, recall from Chapter Four that Trump Vote, Party ID, and the adoption of evangelical 
identity can be understood – at least to an extent – in terms of the effects of the other variables.  This is 
particularly true for the measures of race and education, both of which demonstrate significant effects at 
both Level 1 and Level 2.  For example, while both have significant effects on the adoption of several 
evangelical identities, County Percent White makes respondents one level and White makes respondents 
almost two levels more Republican on the Party ID scale.  County Percent HS makes respondents one 
level less Republican on the Party ID scale and reduces the probability of voting for Trump from above to 
below the .500 level, while, along with Education, also demonstrating significant effects on the adoption 
of several of the evangelical identity measures.  Without further repeating the results from Chapter Four, 
it is apparent that several of the relevant independent variables help explain both political behavior and 
the adoption of evangelical identity.  Taken together, these results suggest that continuing to contend that 
evangelical identity is a predominant determinant of political behavior is a challenging task.   
 Still, if it is nonetheless considered desirable to do so, the most likely path to such an objective is 
an indirect one.  That is, evangelical identity leads to the adoption of Republican identity, which, in turn, 
impacts political behavior.  While such a contention may appear promising initially, that promise 
evaporates upon closer consideration. 
 As revealed above, it is certainly true that Party ID is the only independent variable with a 
marginal effect that is stronger than the strongest evangelical effect in all of the models, both Level 1 and 
Level 2.  It is also true that the magnitude of the Party ID effects are frequently quite a bit stronger than 
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the effects of the other variables.  Where the contention breaks down, however, lies in connecting 
evangelical identity to Republican identity. 
 As discussed in the results presented in Chapter Two, Party ID does appear to be the dependent 
variable upon which evangelical identity has the most consistent effects.  All but one of these measures 
(Church of Christ) are very highly significant (p > 0.000).  In addition, as indicated by the predicted 
values, all of these make respondents more Republican.  However, the effects are so modest that only 
about half of them change the predicted outcome.  Evangelical / Black respondents removed, Lutheran 
Missouri, Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, and Southern Baptist all make 
respondents one level more Republican on the Party ID scale.  The modest impact is made clear by 
including the predicted values and marginal effects, which are Evangelical / Black respondents removed 
(4.153, .459), Lutheran Missouri (4.435, .888), Nondenominational Evangelical (4.616, 1.091), 
Pentecostal Assemblies of God (4.559, 1.011), and Southern Baptist (4.259, .733).  Thus, only two of 
these measures have a marginal effect equivalent to a full level, and none of them have a predicted value 
higher than 4 – Independent – on the seven-point Party ID scale.  These results are consistent with those 
of the Level 2 models, in which Pentecostal Assemblies of God (4.565, 1.017) is the strongest evangelical 
measure. 
 Nor is the contention saved by turning to interaction effects.  Only two of them, 
Nondenominational Evangelical and Southern Baptist with White, produce a higher predicted value on 
the Party ID scale, and that is by only a small margin.  The predicted value for the Nondenominational 
Evangelical / White interaction is 5.105, while the predicted value for the Southern Baptist / White 
interaction is 5.007.  Thus, even the strongest interaction effects produce a predicted value that is barely 
beyond Independent on the Party ID scale.   
 In sum, then, it is certainly accurate to say that the effects of several measures of evangelical 
identity – both direct and indirect – make respondents more Republican than they would be otherwise.  
Based on these results, however, to suggest that evangelical identity makes them into anything near strong 
Republicans is a substantial overstatement. 
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 At this point it may be useful to clarify something these results do not demonstrate.  That is, these 
results do not suggest that Evangelicals do not behave in ways that are more Republican in nature than 
other respondents, only that their evangelical identity is not the primary determinant of that behavior.  For 
example, recall from Chapter Two that Donald Trump received upwards of 60% of the vote from six of 
the evangelical groups in 2016.  However, only three of those groups are statistically significant, and only 
one of those three actually has a positive effect on the probability of voting for Trump.  In other words, 
they voted Republican, but they apparently did not do so due to their evangelical identity. 
 Of course, distinctions such as these are not of much interest to people such as candidates, 
campaigns, and political parties.  After all, their goal is very simple: winning elections.  Thus, they tend to 
be much less interested in why people vote for them than simply in whether people vote for them.  On the 
other hand, of course, distinctions such as these are of great interest to political scientists, as the results 
both improve our understanding of political phenomena and offer guidance for future research. 
 From this perspective, the results here support the contention that evangelical identity is not a 
predominant determinant of political behavior.  While not irrelevant, for literally every dependent 
variable in every model evangelical identity is outweighed by something else.  Exactly what that 
something else is varies, and there is frequently more than one something else, but there are no 
exceptions.  These effects are reviewed briefly below, with Level 1 and Level 2 variables being 
considered together for sake of brevity. 
 Age.  Age outweighs evangelical identity for Trump Vote, Gay Marriage, and Assault Rifle Ban; 
County Percent 62 outweighs evangelical identity for Trump Vote and Dreamer. 
 Education.  Education outweighs evangelical identity for Trump Vote, Pro-Life, Assault Rifle 
Ban, and Dreamer; County Percent HS outweighs evangelical identity for Trump Vote, Pro-Life, Assault 
Rifle Ban, and Dreamer. 
 Race.  White outweighs evangelical identity for Party ID; County Percent White outweighs 
evangelical identity for Party ID and Assault Rifle Ban. 
 Party ID.  Party ID outweighs evangelical identity for all other dependent variables. 
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 Male.  Male outweighs evangelical identity for Assault Rifle Ban. 
 Church Regular.  Church Regular (RELTRAD) outweighs evangelical identity for Gay Marriage 
and Pro-Life. 
 Again, this research addresses only whether other variables outweigh evangelical identity; it does 
not address when or why they do so.  Thus, understanding why it is that some independent variables 
outweigh evangelical identity for some dependent variables but not others could benefit from further 
research. 
 In addition, any lingering concerns regarding causality can be informed by future research.  The 
contention here suggests that the behaviors demonstrated by Evangelicals are not unlike those 
demonstrated by ordinary partisans.  That is, they modify their other positions and perspectives – 
including their faith perspective – in order to reconcile them with their political perspective.  Of course, 
this is contrary to what conventional wisdom suggests – and what most Evangelicals themselves think – 
about how Evangelicals do politics.   
 Ultimately, conclusively determining whether Evangelicals modify their faith perspective to 
reflect their political perspective – or vice versa – will require the use of panel data collected over a 
period of time.  Only then will it be possible to determine which perspective is modified to resolve 
inconsistencies between the two.   
 Of course, these results may also have implications on a range of larger questions, such as 
whether religious identity affects different groups differently.  For example, McKenzie and Rouse (2013) 
explore differing levels of interest in egalitarian issues among white, black, and Latino religious groups.  
The issues included overcoming discrimination against women, reducing intolerance toward 
homosexuals, policies to assist the poor, and policies to achieve racial parity.  As might be expected, the 
level of interest among those considered religiously conservative varied across groups.  Whites were less 
interested in all of these issues.  Latinos were less interested in the gender discrimination and intolerance 
toward homosexuals issues, whereas blacks were less interested only in the intolerance toward 
homosexuals issue.  McKenzie and Rouse contend that these variations are explained by the fact that, 
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even among those with religiously conservative beliefs, religion is experienced in different cultural 
settings across the groups. 
 More recently, Wong (2018) explores differing levels of support for conservative political 
positions among White and non-White evangelicals within the context of the 2016 presidential election.  
She finds that Whites are consistently more conservative – and more Republican - than their non-White 
counterparts across a range of political issues.  Wong contends that this is explained by high levels of “in-
group embattlement” among Whites, which basically means that their political behavior is largely 
motivated by the desire to resist demographic changes they see unfolding in American society. 
 For an even broader context, McAdams and Lance (2012) compare the political behavior of 
American evangelicals with their counterparts in Brazil.  While the two groups look quite similar in their 
positions on moral issues like abortion and gay marriage (Brazilian evangelicals are notably even more 
staunchly opposed to abortion), Brazilian evangelicals otherwise appear somewhat more moderate to 
liberal in their politics, such as party identification.  This suggests that the political environment within 
which individual adherents live out their daily lives also plays an important role in how they view the 
connection between their religion and their politics. 
 These three works are examples of research contending – in various ways – that different 
characteristics or environments can cause people with similar religious beliefs to adopt different political 
behaviors.  While not expressly stated, what is implied in works such as these is that religious identity is 
the primary determinant of political behavior.  Thus, the differing characteristics and environments 
function as intervening factors that produce diverging behaviors from similar religious identities.  Of 
course, this approach requires different models to account for any number of characteristics and 
environments that – supposedly – produce divergent political behaviors from similar religious identities. 
 My contention, on the other hand, presents a much simpler explanatory path.  In my approach, the 
different characteristics or environments are themselves the primary determinants of political behavior, 
and religious identity simply fails to mitigate these influences.  This offers a much more parsimonious 
explanation, while still accounting for how divergent political behaviors can be adopted by people of 
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similar religious identities.  My approach also embraces – rather than contradicts – arguments such as 
those offered by Mason (2018) and others that describe people as modifying their positions and behaviors 
to be consistent with their already determined political identity instead of vice versa. 
 Unfortunately, however, there is one respect in which my approach makes understanding the 
relationship between religious identity and political behavior more challenging.  That is, political 
scientists have gravitated toward using evangelical identity – especially for Whites – as a rather broad 
brush.  Meanwhile, my results suggest that we will need to learn to think of evangelical identity in much 
more precise terms. 
 Table 5.1 presents a summary of the statistically significant effects of the evangelical identity 
measures on all seven dependent variables.  The results are taken from the Level 2 models, which are both 
more complete and reflect overall greater statistical significance for the evangelical measures.  Blacked 
out cells represent effects that fail to reach statistical significance.  Shaded cells represent negative 
effects, while unshaded cells represent positive effects. 
  












































































































 Evangelical is statistically significant for six of the seven dependent variables.  The effects are 
positive for two and negative for four. 
 Church of Christ is statistically significant for three of the seven dependent variables.  The effects 
are positive for two and negative for one. 
 Lutheran Missouri is statistically significant for all seven dependent variables.  The effects are 
positive for four and negative for three. 
 Nondenominational Evangelical is statistically significant for six of the seven dependent 
variables.  The effects are positive for four and negative for two. 
 Pentecostal Assemblies of God is statistically significant for three of the seven dependent 
variables.  The effects are positive for two and negative for one. 
 Southern Baptist is statistically significant for six of the seven dependent variables.  The effects 
are positive for three and negative for three. 
 American Baptist is statistically significant for five of the seven dependent variables.  The effects 
are positive for two and negative for three. 
 Other Baptist is statistically significant for four of the seven dependent variables.  The effects are 
positive for one and negative for three. 
 Thus, Pentecostal Assemblies of God is the only evangelical measure that fails to reach statistical 
significance for a majority of the dependent variables (three).  Lutheran Missouri is the only evangelical 
measure to reach statistical significance for all seven dependent variables, while Nondenominational 
Evangelical and Southern Baptist do so for six out of the seven.  Evangelical, American Baptist, and 
Other Baptist have more negative effects than positive.  Southern Baptist is an even split, with three 
positive and three negative.  The remaining four (Church of Christ, Lutheran Missouri, 
Nondenominational Evangelical, and Pentecostal Assemblies of God) have more positive effects than 
negative. 
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 Looking a bit more closely, Evangelical swims against the stream of the RELTRAD measures by 
reducing the probability of voting for Trump, supporting the Pro-Life position, and agreeing with the 
Racism statement but increasing the probability of supporting Dreamer. 
 Church of Christ is the oddball among the RELTRAD measures, making respondents less likely 
to identify as Republican but more likely to support Gay Marriage and Dreamer.  Thus, Church of Christ 
contradicts literally every other RELTRAD measure on the three dependent variables for which it is 
statistically significant except for American Baptist on Gay Marriage. 
 The results are a bit more stable for the remaining evangelical measures, Lutheran Missouri, 
Nondenominational Evangelical, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, American Baptist, 
and Other Baptist.  With the exception of American Baptist for Party ID, they at least agree as to positive 
vs. negative effects.  However, this ignores the variation with regard to the magnitude of the effects and 
the fact that a number of effects fail to reach statistical significance. 
 If this has begun to appear as something of a mish-mash, that is actually the point.  That is, the 
results are hardly monolithic.  This underscores the need for further study in order to understand more 
fully which measures of evangelical identity have what kinds of connections with what aspects of 
political behavior. 
 Overall, then, the results here are promising, but further work is warranted.  In the meantime, it 
seems safe to suggest that – contrary to the prevailing narrative – Evangelicals have more chameleon than 
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Appendix A: Chapter 2 Models 
Appendix A.1.1 Trump Vote / Evangelical 
Trump Vote  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0218683 .0009951 
Education -.2337521 .0107028 
Party ID 1.000457 .0092978 
Male .2885926 .0300904 
BornAgain .9114944 .0654436 
Protestant .1396647 .0407003 
1.White .4199057 .0435804 
1.Evangelical -.6327425 .1156488 
White*Evangelical    
1 1 .4676926 .089592 
1.ChurchRegular .2967478 .0440705 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical    
1 1 -.3603231 .0815407 






Appendix A.1.2 Trump Vote / Evangelical / Black respondents removed 
 
Trump Vote  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age  .0224169 .0010177 
Education -.2453562 .0109492 
Party ID .9905369 .0096118 
Male  .2602353 .0308538 
BornAgain  .9654286 .0688999 
Protestant  .1948252 .0418197 
1.White  .1783884 .0479727 
1.Evangelical  -.4071632 .1378203 
White*Evangelical    
1 1  .142035 .1123617 
1.ChurchRegular  .3070082 .0450573 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical    
1 1  -.3538203 .0851941 






Appendix A.1.3 Trump Vote / RELTRAD 
TrumpVote Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0212782 .0009826 
Education -.2506549 .0106221  
Party ID 1.006219 .0092771  
Male .2649363 .0299088  
1.White .4355884 .0410454  
1.ChurchofChrist .2123065 .5317723  
White*ChurchofChrist   
1 1 -.3630641 .5427446  
1.LutheranMissouri .6107917 .3547756  
White*LutheranMissouri   
1 1 -.4797307 .3615312  
1.NondenomEvangelical .7226617 .1838767  
White*NondenomEvangelical   
1 1 .1171474 .1751274  
1.OtherBaptist -.1645844 .2543771  
White*OtherBaptist   
1 1 .640054 .2787897  
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod .2339551 .387997  
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod   
1 1 1.143414 .3669973  
1.SouthernBaptist .257032 .177986  
White*SouthernBaptist   
1 1 .5596599 .1851137  
1.AmericanBaptist -.3734499 .3833574  
White*AmericanBaptist   
1 1 1.162309 .4145885  
1.ChurchRegular .4360902 .0376891  
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist   
1 1 -.6162978 .3376319  
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri   
1 1 .0891417 .2599106  
ChurchRegular*NondenomEvangelical   
1 1 -.8175155 .1619113  
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist   
1 1 -.273466 .2812307  
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod   
1 1 -1.000635 .3398962  
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist   
1 1 -.0564086 .1561575  
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist   
1 1 -.7882128 .4048445  






Appendix A.2.1 Party ID / Evangelical 
 
 
Party ID Coef. Std. Err. 
Age  .0037829 .0004918 
Education -.0985266 .0055188 
Male  .3016464 .0161313 
BornAgain  .2392635 .0313866 
Protestant  .2921504 .0231056 
1.White  .8903248 .020446 
1.Evangelical  -.5760785 .0565065 
White*Evangelical    
1 1  1.416886 .0433214 
1.ChurchRegular  .4324279 .0241217 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical    
1 1  -.0316989 .0433649 





Appendix A.2.2 Party ID / Evangelical / Black respondents removed 
 
  
Party ID Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0065419 .0005262 
Education -.1183478 .0058998 
Male .2409421 .0173108 
BornAgain .3691625 .0345653 
Protestant .5096932 .025309 
1.White .418499 .0246876 
1.Evangelical .2851045 .0770764 
White*Evangelical   
1 1 .2264895 .0638089 
1.ChurchRegular .5033112 .0259211 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical   
1 1 -.0455681 .0481809 













Appendix A.2.3 Party ID / RELTRAD 
 
  
Party ID Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0045712 .0004903 
Education -.1164883  .0055358 
Male .2729527  .0162345 
1.White 1.027518  .0195814 
1.ChurchofChrist .0875136  .2589779 
White*ChurchofChrist   
1 1 -.0750191  .266019 
1.LutheranMissouri 1.179514  .2367442 
White*LutheranMissouri   
1 1 -.3786648  .2405946 
1.NondenomEvangelical .7392397  .1042821 
White*NondenomEvangelical   
1 1 .5650183  .1012195 
1.OtherBaptist -.708778  .0978496 
White*OtherBaptist   
1 1 1.539114  .1189674 
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod 1.13544  .2135011 
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod   
1 1 -.2351779  .2046879 
1.SouthernBaptist -.3451747  .0811711 
White*SouthernBaptist   
1 1 1.544629  .0869623 
1.AmericanBaptist -.5939713  .1392147 
White*AmericanBaptist   
1 1 1.229077  .166878 
1.ChurchRegular .6483026  .0204642 
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist   
1 1 -.8873336  .2022127 
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri   
1 1 -.0726812  .1554892 
ChurchRegular*NondenomEvangelical   
1 1 -.2105377  .0943196 
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist   
1 1 -.0183766  .1294695 
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod   
1 1 .1706323  .1750107 
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist   
1 1 -.1318118  .0784631 
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist   
1 1 -.6355903  .171625 




Appendix A.3.1 Gay Marriage / Evangelical 
 
 
Gay Marriage  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age -.0202212 .0006396 
Education .1495615 .0071951 
Party ID -.3754321 .0052552 
Male -.3649503 .0207763 
BornAgain -1.137005 .0361301 
Protestant -.2905167 .0285796 
1.White .5591855 .0271097 
1.Evangelical -.1904768 .0657806 
White*Evangelical   
1 1 .1402878 .0531469 
1.ChurchRegular -1.151268 .0279673 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical   
1 1 -.0229056 .0515553 





Appendix A.3.2 Gay Marriage / Evangelical / Black respondents removed 
 
 
Gay Marriage  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age -.0206661 .0006948 
Education .1488869 .007806 
Party ID -.4032847 .0056555 
Male -.4377338 .0226273 
BornAgain -1.110275 .040054 
Protestant -.2497341 .0313554 
1.White .370819 .0326644 
1.Evangelical -.1449751 .0932616 
White*Evangelical   
1 1 .0338607 .0803646 
1.ChurchRegular -1.21831 .0302905 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical   
1 1 .0226523 .0584279 










Appendix A.3.3 Gay Marriage / RELTRAD 
 
  
Gay Marriage  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age -.0196326 .000614 
Education .1786094 .0070025 
Party ID -.3799934 .005124 
Male -.2879301 .0201284 
1.White .6632183 .0250379 
1.ChurchofChrist -.1226224 .309942 
White*ChurchofChrist    
1 1 .3090511 .3178734 
1.LutheranMissouri -.2692237 .2696568 
White*LutheranMissouri    
1 1 -.098491 .2751878 
1.NondenomEvangelical -1.517422 .1244904 
White*NondenomEvangelical    
1 1 .0290504 .1265172 
1.OtherBaptist -.5570736 .1139882 
White*OtherBaptist    
1 1 -.1243818 .1388483 
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod -1.578188 .2947846 
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod   
1 1 .3922576 .3071438 
1.SouthernBaptist -.6183683 .0943546 
White*SouthernBaptist    
1 1 -.3832773 .1026733 
1.AmericanBaptist -.692388 .1591029 
White*AmericanBaptist    
1 1 -.0615757 .1890189 
1.ChurchRegular -1.583106 .0241093 
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist    
1 1 .8330618 .2432368 
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri    
1 1 .1320017 .1864777 
ChurchRegular* NondenomEvangelical   
1 1 .6591378 .1162332 
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist    
1 1 -.1329527 .1550606 
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod    
1 1 -.1808404 .2457278 
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist    
1 1 .0161138 .098821 
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist    
1 1 .6452252 .193822 




Appendix A.4.1 Pro-Life / Evangelical 
 
 
Pro-Life  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0004596 .000523 
Education -.1492892 .0059143 
Party ID .1776326 .0042981 
Male .3417723 .0172033 
BornAgain .661391 .0332332 
Protestant .1813066 .0243244 
1.White -.4038115 .0219976 
1.Evangelical -.0049071 .0595689 
White*Evangelical    
1 1 .0071375 .04583 
1.ChurchRegular .5274273 .0253581 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical    
1 1 -.7654044 .0456704 






Appendix A.4.2 Pro-Life / Evangelical / Black respondents removed 
 
  
Pro-Life  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0002294 .0005583 
Education -.1436206 .0063047 
Party ID .1912359 .0045592 
Male .3604107 .0183865 
BornAgain .6716528 .0365481 
Protestant .2065842 .0265874 
1.White -.437821 .0260165 
1.Evangelical -.2517528 .0809974 
White*Evangelical    
1 1 .2857756 .0666502 
1.ChurchRegular .5402657 .0271595 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical    
1 1 -.9020809 .0506836 









Appendix A.4.3 Pro-Life / RELTRAD 
 
  
Pro-Life  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0003046 .0005139  
Education -.1612119 .0058614  
Party ID .1844733 .0042441  
Male .3242611 .0170394  
1.White -.4358442 .0209365  
1.ChurchofChrist -.3414545 .2781628  
White*ChurchofChrist    
1 1 .3606824 .2853639  
1.LutheranMissouri .287408 .2480979  
White*LutheranMissouri    
1 1 .0937965 .2523523  
1.NondenomEvangelical .4316619 .1087659  
White*NondenomEvangelical    
1 1 .1381846 .1053432  
1.OtherBaptist .3757551 .0999189  
White*OtherBaptist    
1 1 -.0296809 .1221654  
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod .7173293 .2281108  
White* PentecostalAssembliesofGod   
1 1 -.0004371 .2154135  
1.SouthernBaptist .4366291 .0837066  
White*SouthernBaptist    
1 1 .1133256 .0902413  
1.AmericanBaptist .6192357 .1443295  
White*AmericanBaptist    
1 1 .0385879 .174123  
1.ChurchRegular .563099 .0214196  
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist    
1 1 -.4269443 .2137287  
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri    
1 1 -.0926193 .164342  
ChurchRegular* NondenomEvangelical   
1 1 -.5982108 .0984844  
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist    
1 1 -.6046604 .132836  
ChurchRegular* PentecostalAssembliesofGod   
1 1 -1.165016 .1858443  
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist    
1 1 -.5265911 .0819149  
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist    
1 1 -.5130705 .1790932  




Appendix A.5.1 Assault Rifle Ban / Evangelical 
 
 
Assault Rifle Ban  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age  .0183196 .0006035 
Education .0977688 .0066981 
Party ID -.4270686 .0051002 
Male  -.9319193 .0196346 
BornAgain  -.3422688 .0366685 
Protestant  -.0447066 .0282623 
1.White  -.0408422 .0257736 
1.Evangelical  .1887054 .0692143 
White*Evangelical    
1 1  -.197465 .0541395 
1.ChurchRegular  .0203483 .0290455 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical    
1 1  .0720541 .0508506 





Appendix A.5.2 Assault Rifle Ban / Evangelical / Black respondents removed 
 
  
Assault Rifle Ban  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age  .0174433 .0006326 
Education .0881926 .0070179 
Party ID -.4335035 .0054345 
Male  -.9611309 .0207424 
BornAgain  -.3485059 .0394889 
Protestant  -.0660493 .0300865 
1.White  -.003099 .0296834 
1.Evangelical  .0092939 .0877177 
White*Evangelical    
1 1  .0201073 .0723029 
1.ChurchRegular  .0286154 .0305434 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical    
1 1  .0482372 .0543441 










Appendix A.5.3 Assault Rifle Ban / RELTRAD 
 
  
Assault Rifle Ban  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0185205 .0005971  
Education .1056584 .0066694  
Party ID -.4301708 .0050739  
Male -.9225024 .0195589  
1.White -.0436786 .0246086  
1.ChurchofChrist -.0764085 .3431014  
White*ChurchofChrist    
1 1 .134807 .3537471  
1.LutheranMissouri -.4364925 .2692529  
White*LutheranMissouri    
1 1 .2468563 .2744313  
1.NondenomEvangelical -.3535095 .1222103  
White*NondenomEvangelical    
1 1 -.3115794 .1190656  
1.OtherBaptist -.1184809 .1271285  
White*OtherBaptist    
1 1 -.2192191 .1475138  
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod -.0224184 .2471098  
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod    
1 1 -.1669827 .2345619  
1.SouthernBaptist .0018289 .1059617  
White*SouthernBaptist    
1 1 -.3265618 .1114075  
1.AmericanBaptist -.0939738 .1843166  
White*AmericanBaptist    
1 1 .2294599 .2114774  
1.ChurchRegular -.0696268 .0244306  
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist    
1 1 .2941232 .2616151  
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri    
1 1 .0611573 .1742801  
ChurchRegular*NondenomEvangelical    
1 1 .424339 .1068863  
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist    
1 1 -.1195511 .1578118  
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod    
1 1 -.0722065 .1963977  
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist    
1 1 .0601109 .0909095  
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist    
1 1 .0567836 .2158999  




Appendix A.6.1 Dreamer / Evangelical 
 
 
Dreamer  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age -.0032141 .0005301 
Education .1504775 .0059502 
Party ID -.3074967 .0044738 
Male -.0482948 .0174079 
BornAgain -.4512848 .0343349 
Protestant -.0583273 .0247399 
1.White .0871213 .0220235 
1.Evangelical .1779207 .0608111 
White*Evangelical    
1 1 .0105589 .0470258 
1.ChurchRegular -.0477958 .0260278 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical    
1 1 .1143443 .0475574 






Appendix A.6.2 Dreamer / Evangelical / Black respondents removed 
 
 
Dreamer  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age -.0032382 .0005678 
Education .1529532 .0063637 
Party ID -.3266333 .0047663 
Male -.0796351 .0186763 
BornAgain -.4502461 .038133 
Protestant -.025744 .0271682 
1.White .0499006 .0261924 
1.Evangelical .2745472 .0836422 
White*Evangelical    
1 1 -.0861787 .0690204 
1.ChurchRegular -.027261 .0280235 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical    
1 1 .0933486 .0533614 









Appendix A.6.3 Dreamer / RELTRAD 
 
  
Dreamer  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age  -.0028698 .0005237 
Education .1577765 .0059259 
Party ID -.3115446 .0044411 
Male  -.044288 .0173508 
1.White  .0894824 .0210684 
1.ChurchofChrist  -.4733862 .2717222 
White*ChurchofChrist    
1 1  .6707243 .2795479 
1.LutheranMissouri  -.7760188 .2686419 
White*LutheranMissouri    
1 1  .6039703 .2719421 
1.NondenomEvangelical  -.1104573 .1120132 
White*NondenomEvangelical    
1 1  -.212719 .1086655 
1.OtherBaptist  -.3917931 .1021177 
White*OtherBaptist    
1 1  .0524617 .1293797 
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod  .0476698 .2303022 
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod    
1 1  -.1835005 .2205426 
1.SouthernBaptist  -.4098527 .0859483 
White*SouthernBaptist    
1 1  .1536727 .0938558 
1.AmericanBaptist  -.4949253 .1451273 
White*AmericanBaptist    
1 1  .4283971 .1777041 
1.ChurchRegular  -.143785 .0220806 
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist    
1 1  .3808702 .2184884 
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri    
1 1  .273532 .1696478 
ChurchRegular*NondenomEvangelical    
1 1  .3622875 .1038781 
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist    
1 1  -.1277389 .1432163 
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod    
1 1  .3346283 .1923911 
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist    
1 1  .0003797 .0878145 
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist    
1 1  .0702557 .1828359 




Appendix A.7.1 Racism / Evangelical 
 
 
Racism  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age -.0035316 .0003242 
Education -.0236027 .0035224 
Party ID .1892127 .0025167 
Male .2661641 .0102469 
BornAgain .3796052 .0209972 
Protestant .0556057 .0141956 
1.White .1018802 .0136385 
1.Evangelical -.2620472 .0371183 
White*Evangelical    
1 1 .0241012 .0285524 
1.ChurchRegular .1900284 .0153157 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical    
1 1 -.1782052 .0271177 





Appendix A.7.2 Racism / Evangelical / Black respondents removed 
 
  
Racism  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age -.0030768 .00034 
Education -.0198859 .003691 
Party ID .1871537 .0026368 
Male .2737636 .0107429 
BornAgain .3985306 .0225231 
Protestant .0832475 .0151654 
1.White .0198283 .015871 
1.Evangelical -.1663847 .0482716 
White*Evangelical    
1 1 -.107652 .0398622 
1.ChurchRegular .193024 .0161023 
ChurchRegular*Evangelical    
1 1 -.1793862 .0292221 










Appendix A.7.3 Racism / RELTRAD 
 
  
Racism  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age  -.0037929 .0003222 
Education -.0299979 .0035145 
Party ID .1914226 .0024993 
Male  .2622273 .0102611 
1.White  .0881071 .0130556 
1.ChurchofChrist  .1495238 .166964 
White*ChurchofChrist    
1 1  -.1193649 .1714739 
1.LutheranMissouri  .4385229 .1432789 
White*LutheranMissouri    
1 1  -.2675243 .1453682 
1.NondenomEvangelical  .112 .0664509 
White*NondenomEvangelical    
1 1  .1143579 .064077 
1.OtherBaptist  -.0078103 .0661781 
White*OtherBaptist    
1 1  .1337418 .0778217 
1.PentecostalAssembliesofGod  -.0311238 .1340519 
White*PentecostalAssembliesofGod    
1 1  .0445625 .1307338 
1.SouthernBaptist  .0841611 .0539855 
White*SouthernBaptist    
1 1  .0726944 .0568621 
1.AmericanBaptist  .2653439 .0931804 
White*AmericanBaptist    
1 1  -.0482511 .1090562 
1.ChurchRegular  .2154379 .0130351 
ChurchRegular*ChurchofChrist    
1 1  -.3550945 .1208819 
ChurchRegular*LutheranMissouri    
1 1  -.0498779 .0918976 
ChurchRegular*NondenomEvangelical    
1 1  -.2347313 .0572676 
ChurchRegular*OtherBaptist    
1 1  -.1051526 .0843149 
ChurchRegular*PentecostalAssembliesofGod    
1 1  -.1540034 .1051556 
ChurchRegular*SouthernBaptist    
1 1  -.2022125 .0483414 
ChurchRegular*AmericanBaptist    
1 1  .0030223 .1130983 






Appendix B: Chapter 3 Models 
 






Appendix B.1.2 Trump Vote / RELTRAD Clustered 
 
  
Trump Vote  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0205374 .0013891 
Education -.2298895 .0108218 
Party ID 1.007066 .0135866 
Male .2842553 .0322646 
White .4751409 .0468155 
ChurchRegular .3661526 .0450866 
ChurchofChrist -.2552904 .1408199 
LutheranMissouri .2115033 .1113503 
NondenomEvangelical .3096058 .0781966 
PentecostalAssembliesofGod .4557678 .1910386 
SouthernBaptist .6024005 .078309 
AmericanBaptist .1575897 .1882182 
OtherBaptist .171569 .1120654 
CountyPercent62 .024551 .0050907 
CountyPercentWhite .0065346 .0015488 
CountyPercentHS -.0375216 .0040676 
SouBaptStates .0806703 .0413029 
CountyPopulation -8.96e-09 8.74e-09 
Constant -2.778207 .3783781 
Trump Vote Coef.  Std. Err. 
Age .0211087 .0013194 
Education -.2153979 .0109764 
Party ID 1.003676 .0129273 
Male .3065473 .0323031 
White .5159424 .0479471 
ChurchRegular .2020668 .0454884 
BornAgain .9081089 .0926148 
Protestant .1257283 .0424093 
Evangelical -.4778607 .1054642 
CountyPercent62 .0247832 .0048585 
CountyPercentWhite .0058411 .0015116 
CountyPercentHS -.0347234 .0040212 
SouBaptStates .0635045 .0409472 
CountyPopulation -4.10e-09 8.03e-09 




Appendix B.2.1 Party ID / Evangelical Clustered 
 
 
Party ID Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0032103 .0007296 
Education -.0853226 .0074144 
Male .3272211 .0178379 
White 1.071722 .0450384 
ChurchRegular .4130244 .0294347 
BornAgain .2589571 .0576077 
Protestant .2582163 .028632 
Evangelical .3585742 .0629981 
CountyPercent62 -.004823 .0038431 
CountyPercentWhite .0152286 .001621 
CountyPercentHS -.0107446 .0032029 
SouBaptStates .1671929 .0335444 
CountyPopulation 5.27e-09 1.17e-08 





Appendix B.2.2 Party ID / RELTRAD Clustered 
 
  
Party ID Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0040511 .0007358 
Education -.097513 .0072112 
Male .2967447 .0178245 
White 1.034811 .0426622 
ChurchRegular .6054913 .0324613 
ChurchofChrist -.2347662 .0877399 
LutheranMissouri .7651014 .0722268 
NondenomEvangelical 1.003382 .0473601 
PentecostalAssembliesofGod 1.016983 .0866534 
SouthernBaptist .6356176 .0445664 
AmericanBaptist -.1809537 .0872658 
OtherBaptist .1066715 .0627206 
CountyPercent62 -.0037885 .0037228 
CountyPercentWhite .0154664 .0016346 
CountyPercentHS -.0133931 .0033167 
SouBaptStates .2055125 .0346974 
CountyPopulation -2.70e-09 1.22e-08 





Appendix B.3.1 Gay Marriage / Evangelical Clustered 
 
  
Gay Marriage Coef.  Std. Err. 
Age -.0205334 .0008314 
Education .1424022 .0088064 
Party ID -.3730504 .008576 
Male -.3675686 .0232351 
White .5714583 .0341433 
ChurchRegular -1.160004 .0280239 
BornAgain -1.107011 .0396617 
Protestant -.2808187 .0306787 
Evangelical -.1084027 .0500803 
CountyPercent62 -.0003003 .0032068 
CountyPercentWhite -.0002535 .0010282 
CountyPercentHS .0179439 .0026605 
SouBaptStates -.0828648 .0273316 
CountyPopulation 2.56e-08 6.33e-09 





Appendix B.3.2 Gay Marriage / RELTRAD Clustered 
 
  
Gay Marriage  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age -.0198962 .0008761 
Education .1681763 .0087915 
Party ID -.3793652 .0092393 
Male -.29844 .0231472 
White .6243954 .0382669 
ChurchRegular -1.534943 .0247441 
ChurchofChrist .3794967 .1216911 
LutheranMissouri -.3496958 .075425 
NondenomEvangelical -1.162739 .0618093 
PentecostalAssembliesofGod -1.343345 .1299738 
SouthernBaptist -.7705477 .0485744 
AmericanBaptist -.4797268 .0975319 
OtherBaptist -.6193353 .0656755 
CountyPercent62 -.0016807 .0033255 
CountyPercentWhite -.0006286 .0011089 
CountyPercentHS .0230803 .0029722 
SouBaptStates -.1746288 .0298972 
CountyPopulation 3.68e-08 8.80e-09 




Appendix B.4.1 Pro-Life / Evangelical Clustered 
 
 
Pro-Life  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0006922 .0006277 
Education -.1417305 .0066444 
Party ID .1744761 .0055848 
Male .3491693 .0199304 
White -.4165091 .0254891 
ChurchRegular .2931875 .0266017 
BornAgain .7159671 .036042 
Protestant .1861336 .0266206 
Evangelical -.4297077 .0455918 
CountyPercent62 -.003347 .0029079 
CountyPercentWhite .0035856 .0007912 
CountyPercentHS -.013578 .0023339 
SouBaptStates .0316507 .0240842 
CountyPopulation -1.94e-08 4.15e-09 





Appendix B.4.2 Pro-Life / RELTRAD Clustered 
 
  
Pro-Life  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0005093 .0006815 
Education -.1534708 .006682 
Party ID .1811294 .0059221 
Male .3335378 .0203662 
White -.4412082 .0271743 
ChurchRegular .4620681 .0267121 
ChurchofChrist -.1299691 .0917198 
LutheranMissouri .3549118 .0753855 
NondenomEvangelical .1824563 .0507891 
PentecostalAssembliesofGod .0022519 .0948202 
SouthernBaptist .2461712 .0438611 
AmericanBaptist .4610389 .0870566 
OtherBaptist .1724489 .0621449 
CountyPercent62 -.003093 .0028797 
CountyPercentWhite .0036854 .0007973 
CountyPercentHS -.0160003 .0023284 
SouBaptStates .0659303 .0245803 
CountyPopulation -2.25e-08 4.49e-09 




Appendix B.5.1 Assault Rifle Ban / Evangelical Clustered 
  
 
Assault Rifle Ban  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0184027 .0006132 
Education .0848622 .0073452 
Party ID -.423184 .0088984 
Male -.9487747 .0228375 
White -.0224883 .0310995 
ChurchRegular .0428024 .0299812 
BornAgain -.333632 .0398809 
Protestant -.0183573 .0290655 
Evangelical .0869027 .051894 
CountyPercent62 .0052842 .0029622 
CountyPercentWhite -.0091859 .0009818 
CountyPercentHS .0151846 .0026895 
SouBaptStates -.1069068 .0269791 
CountyPopulation 2.18e-08 1.30e-08 





Appendix B.5.2 Assault Rifle Ban / RELTRAD Clustered 
 
  
Assault Rifle Ban Coef. Std. Err. 
Age  .0186526 .000615 
Education .0915542 .0073719 
Party ID -.4249245 .0091164 
Male  -.9413321 .0226623 
White  -.011218 .0317534 
ChurchRegular  -.0373399 .0304307 
ChurchofChrist  .1208988 .1162142 
LutheranMissouri  -.1822687 .0756284 
NondenomEvangelical  -.3143777 .0518453 
PentecostalAssembliesofGod  -.1779295 .0964519 
SouthernBaptist  -.1671508 .0487342 
AmericanBaptist  .0671799 .1109301 
OtherBaptist  -.2629798 .0710173 
CountyPercent62  .0050717 .0030413 
CountyPercentWhite  -.0092647 .0010074 
CountyPercentHS  .0164186 .0027422 
SouBaptStates  -.117627 .0275356 
CountyPopulation  2.31e-08 1.36e-08 






Appendix B.6.1 Dreamer / Evangelical Clustered 
 
 
Dreamer  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age  -.0029647 .000574 
Education .1456023 .0062291 
Party ID -.3075968 .0053958 
Male  -.0509442 .0167699 
White  .0912188 .0265025 
ChurchRegular  -.0184353 .0243558 
BornAgain  -.4587192 .0381928 
Protestant  -.0624535 .0267081 
Evangelical  .2490499 .0473068 
CountyPercent62  -.0108757 .0027822 
CountyPercentWhite  .0008942 .0008042 
CountyPercentHS  .0092232 .0023342 
SouBaptStates  .0658534 .022919 
CountyPopulation  1.55e-08 7.97e-09 





Appendix B.6.2 Dreamer / RELTRAD Clustered 
 
  
Dreamer  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age -.002658 .0005873 
Education .1519869 .0062457 
Party ID -.3108605 .0055409 
Male  -.046895 .016665 
White  .1022604 .0263955 
ChurchRegular  -.1240216 .0229061 
ChurchofChrist  .2078265 .0962718 
LutheranMissouri  -.1637637 .0771251 
NondenomEvangelical  -.0430116 .0492478 
PentecostalAssembliesofGod  .1152611 .096875 
SouthernBaptist  -.3140428 .0443736 
AmericanBaptist  -.2631578 .0973307 
OtherBaptist  -.4022233 .0643128 
CountyPercent62  -.0109928 .0028395 
CountyPercentWhite  .0007279 .0008056 
CountyPercentHS  .010412 .0023061 
SouBaptStates .0612215 .0229322 
CountyPopulation  1.55e-08 7.93e-09 






Appendix B.7.1 Racism / Evangelical Clustered 
 
 
Racism  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age  -.0034915 .0004597 
Education -.0222524 .004205 
Party ID .1888202 .0038003 
Male  .2666974 .0115357 
White  .1036215 .016428 
ChurchRegular  .1341685 .0182645 
BornAgain  .3945493 .0361997 
Protestant  .0608013 .0143766 
Evangelical  -.3429204 .0394361 
CountyPercent62  -.0002116 .0014102 
CountyPercentWhite  .0016945 .0005501 
CountyPercentHS  -.0030843 .0014434 
SouBaptStates  -.0112841 .0163503 
CountyPopulation  1.15e-08 3.92e-09 




Appendix B.7.2 Racism / RELTRAD Clustered 
 
  
Racism  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age  -.0037458 .0004982 
Education -.0283662 .0040716 
Party ID .1912246 .0038797 
Male  .262955 .0116072 
White  .0917711 .0165477 
ChurchRegular  .1839065 .0202591 
ChurchofChrist  -.0476464 .0524409 
LutheranMissouri  .1789652 .042586 
NondenomEvangelical  .0604217 .0296356 
PentecostalAssembliesofGod  -.0810034 .0590264 
SouthernBaptist  .0519358 .0269556 
AmericanBaptist  .2504556 .0612183 
OtherBaptist  .0467795 .0401211 
CountyPercent62 -.0003188 .0014363 
CountyPercentWhite  .001787 .0005549 
CountyPercentHS  -.0042088 .0014771 
SouBaptStates  -.0007558 .0168613 
CountyPopulation  1.06e-08 4.01e-09 







Appendix C: Chapter 4 Models 
 
Appendix C.1 Evangelical Clustered 
 
  
Evangelical Coef.  Std. Err. 
Age .0095244 .00077 
Education -.1093439 .0096451 
Party ID .1905624 .0069569 
Male -.2698019 .0237913 
White -.4356989 .0426195 
ChurchRegular 1.825896 .0284754 
SouBaptStates .6162556 .0520693 
CountyPopulation -9.88e-08 3.92e-08 
CountyPercent62 .0001577 .0058143 
CountyPercentWhite .0027147 .001925 
CountyPercentHS -.0247519 .0049104 





Appendix C.2 Church of Christ Clustered 
 
  
Church of Christ Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0298924 .0026545 
Education .1692254 .0312178 
Party ID -.065287 .0213205 
Male -.0705601 .092584 
White .6124535 .1550899 
ChurchRegular .0917636 .1050323 
SouBaptStates -.6242098 .1268812 
CountyPopulation 3.60e-08 3.22e-08 
CountyPercent62 .0161987 .0109255 
CountyPercentWhite .0126458 .0057952 
CountyPercentHS .0285494 .0149941 











Appendix C.3 Lutheran Missouri Clustered 
 
  
Lutheran Missouri Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0252825 .0021349 
Education .0623124 .0239605 
Party ID .1721625 .0180948 
Male .0111741 .0730382 
White .8097683 .1284099 
ChurchRegular -.0796373 .0784321 
SouBaptStates -.0899749 .0989062 
CountyPopulation 5.91e-08 3.54e-08 
CountyPercent62 -.0054922 .01036 
CountyPercentWhite .0152362 .0036334 
CountyPercentHS .0287472 .0109913 






Appendix C.4 Nondenominational Evangelical Clustered 
 
  
Nondenominational Evangelical Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0036172 .0016099 
Education .0502776 .0149119 
Party ID .2374231 .0116369 
Male -.1036882 .0477153 
White -.311474 .0567387 
ChurchRegular 1.430055 .0531047 
SouBaptStates .0907102 .0610278 
CountyPopulation 8.21e-09 1.48e-08 
CountyPercent62 -.0199291 .0066082 
CountyPercentWhite .0080115 .0022152 
CountyPercentHS .0060577 .0060829 












Appendix C.5 Pentecostal Assemblies of God Clustered 
 
  
Pentecostal Assemblies of God Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0036004 .0022781 
Education -.1443887 .0311029 
Party ID .2504752 .0248094 
Male -.0165033 .0857792 
White -.1080968 .1188775 
ChurchRegular 1.396039 .0941938 
SouBaptStates -.064766 .1071893 
CountyPopulation -9.68e-08 5.16e-08 
CountyPercent62 -.0008432 .0107423 
CountyPercentWhite .0074052 .0035459 
CountyPercentHS -.0161998 .0088683 





Appendix C.6 Southern Baptist Clustered 
 
  
Southern Baptist Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0148426 .0012318 
Education -.0924335 .0163665 
Party ID .1439539 .0110573 
Male .0689799 .0408223 
White -.0972165 .060829 
ChurchRegular .7435409 .0444048 
SouBaptStates 1.603888 .069854 
CountyPopulation -1.72e-07 7.29e-08 
CountyPercent62 -.0122179 .007143 
CountyPercentWhite -.0063489 .0022351 
CountyPercentHS -.0317596 .0064932 












Appendix C.7 American Baptist Clustered 
 
  
American Baptist  Coef. Std. Err. 
Age .0066381 .0028082 
Education -.1622101 .0313436 
Party ID -.0532374 .0231481 
Male -.1467802 .0860568 
White -.9557701 .0922129 
ChurchRegular .5398468 .093774 
SouBaptStates -.1504644 .0987707 
CountyPopulation -1.47e-07 4.60e-08 
CountyPercent62 .0075132 .0098906 
CountyPercentWhite -.0048072 .003133 
CountyPercentHS .004224 .0096555 





Appendix C.8 Other Baptist Clustered 
 
  
Other Baptist Coef.  Std. Err. 
Age -.0004012  .001889 
Education -.1703592  .02216 
Party ID .022939  .0155851 
Male -.3835466  .0635038 
White -.8093369  .0723797 
ChurchRegular .0914408  .072406 
SouBaptStates .5281368  .0722102 
CountyPopulation -6.11e-08  3.99e-08 
CountyPercent62 .0185273  .0071857 
CountyPercentWhite -.0041374  .002442 
CountyPercentHS -.0140684  .0067393 
Constant -1.744781  .6053075 
 
